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ABSTRACT

Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter are worthy
of examination because in many ways their tenures on the
Supreme Court present a fascinating study in similarity.

The

influence of his friend and mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
is clearly visible in the career of Felix Frankfurter.
Because neither jurist can be labeled as either liberal
conservative,

or

the opinions they rendered often found the

legalistic issues of specific cases superseding political
expediency,

and often the reverse was true. For both,

the

integrity of the law would repeatedly take precedence over
their shared skepticism,

and though surely patriots, neither

man believed that the Constitution must be read as an
unchanging catechism.

It was such complexity of philosophy

which made the time each spent on the Supreme Court so
important to the history of American jurisprudence. Had
either walked an absolutists line, he might have left a far
less impressive heritage.
To study these men is to be privy to a relationship
which began at Harvard Law School and displayed itself in a
shared intellectual

elitism that importantly defined the

years each of them sat on the bench.

Examining their work is discovering a strong thread of
similarity which binds both
philosophy as

lives inlaw and their

human beings. Because neither can be

irrevocably categorized,
special

their

they are representative of that

quality which sets the memorable apart from the

ordinary.
What

I plan is an examination of the most telling cases

in the careers of both of these great

judges. My interest is

in presenting documentation that their decisions were hardly
characteristic of an always divinable ideology.
Inconsistency
Court.

gave color to both their careers on the

The possibility that the human intellect is capable

of finding new answers is appropriate to a true
understanding of the credo which underscored the juristic
lives of Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes,

Jr.

is the sense of what represents the responsibility of a
Supreme Court

justice which joins

work where it may be found.
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C H AP T ER 1

INTRODUCTION
In 1938,

Felix Frankfurter published his book,

Mr.Justice Holmes And the Supreme C o u r t . In the
introduction,

Frankfurter said:

It is plain, therefore, that judges are not merely
expert reporters of pre-existing law. Because of
the free play of judgment allowed by the
Constitution, judges inevitably fashion law. And
law is one of the shaping forces of society...We
speak of the Court as though it were an
abstraction. To be sure, the Court is an
institution, but individuals, with all their
diversities of endowment, experience and outlook,
determine its actions.
Justice Frankfurter is an enigma for those who would
categorize the judges who have served on the Supreme Court
of the United States. Must we put only certain men in the
camp of the Legal Realists and others into that of the
Formalists? Can we draw the lines

so sharply, or must we

accept the fact that we deprive ourselves of understanding
in our desire to place individuals in discreet ideological
packages? Oliver Wendell Holmes is generally accepted as the
prime exponent of Legal Realism on the Court,
and his novitiate,

Felix Frankfurter,

but both he

often appeared to

^■Frankfurter, Felix, Mr. Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938) P.8
1

stand somewhere in legal
decisions.

limbo as we consider their

The Constitution was clearly not an unchanging

document for either man.
the intentional
Constitutional

The Court's members must recognize

"vagueness" which characterized
law, but they must also not overstep what

both saw as the necessary bounds of their position.

Rather

than seeing the Constitution as a rigid set of stipulated
liberties,

Frankfurter insisted that it rested upon an

historical

evolution of basic ideas. His

judicial

restraint

meant an awareness that the Supreme Court had to limit its
intervention into political
his to be a rational,

questions.

balanced,

Frankfurter sought

system-conserving position.

His "realism" was not always unconditional.

The Court was

only to be political when the situation appeared to require
it. The People alone could enjoy the privilege of unfettered
political

opinion,

but the judge must serve as "teacher" in

the Socratic sense.
Freed from absolute and immutable first
principles, the judge, through the disinterested
exercise of judgment, could adapt principle to the
changing needs of the progressive society.
The rise of the expert, in his view, was
democracy's inevitable response to a changing
world; the judge, given the same freedom, would
protect democracy from its own divisive forces.

^Silverstein. Mark. Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1984) P. 55

Accepting what was the primary responsibility of the
Court and commingling it with his Constitutional
Justice Frankfurter's

viewpoint,

legal philosophy found him balancing

between two warring ideological

camps. His was surely not

the apparently "formalist" position of those,

like Justice

Black, who would choose to incorporate the tenets of the
Bill of Rights into any and all decisions,

nor was it that

of others who would ask of the judge that he be purely a
"relativistic" political

animal.

Neither Felix Frankfurter or his mentor,
Holmes,

can be considered categorical

accepted sense of the word.

Oliver Wendell

realists in the

They were, no doubt,

"progressive" as to their more open reading of the
Constitution,

but neither ignored those necessary limits

which must exist as it concerned the extent of the Court's
decision making power.

The Court must not be totally

political nor dogmatically literal.
Balance was the issue for Frankfurter,
chosen this position for himself,

and having

his decisions on the bench

would vary from formalistic to skeptical- - from non-political
to political

from liberal

to conservative

from rule

oriented to pragmatic.
Both men are often examples of a paradoxical philosophy
of judicial behavior.

Both,

as they grew older, came to r e 

consider their over-riding skepticism.

Neither Frankfurter

or Holmes would retire from the bench having remained
unchangingly faithful

to a realist point of view.

Holmes and Frankfurter are worthy of examination
because in many ways their individual

tenures on the Supreme

Court present a fascinating study in similarity.

The

influence of his friend and mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
is clearly visible in the career of Felix Frankfurter.
Because neither jurist can be labeled as either conservative
or liberal,

the opinions they rendered often found the

legalistic issues of specific cases superseding political
expediency.

For both,

the integrity of the law would

repeatedly take precedence over their shared skepticism,
though surely patriots,

and

neither man believed that the

Constitution must be read as an unchanging catechism.

It was

such complexity of philosophy which made the time each spent
on the Supreme Court so important to the history of American
jurisprudence.

Had either walked an absolutists

line, he

might have left a far less impressive heritage.
To study these great

judges is to be privy to a

relationship which began at Harvard Law School
display itself in a shared intellectual

and would

elitism that

importantly defined the years each of them sat on the bench.
Examining their work is discovering a strong thread of
similarity which bound their lives in law and their
philosophy as human beings.

Because neither can be

categorized,

they are representative of that special quality

which sets the memorable apart from the ordinary.
What I plan here is an examination of the most telling
cases in the careers of both these men. My interest is in
presenting documentation that their decisions were hardly
characteristic of an always divinable ideology.

Their

inconsistency was what gave color to both their careers on
the Court.

The possibility that the human intellect is

capable of finding new answers is appropriate to a true
understanding of the credo which underscored the judicial
lives of both.

The sense that the basic essence of American

jurisprudence was constructive openness to change is that
philosophy which we can find reflected in their contribution
to the history of the Supreme Court.
Socrates might well have argued that both teacher and
students can grow in the dialogic process.

Holmes and

Frankfurter developed in context with a particular sort of
dialectic.

For them,

that dialogue was both a personal

well as a public phenomenon.

as

F r a n k f u r t e r ’s words speak well

to such a belief.

Self-contradiction was not always a

negative for him.

It could often be characteristic of

positive evolution.1*

*In 1941, Frankfurter wrote, "It would be comfortable to discover
a Procrustean formula...If such were the process of Constitutional
adjudications in this most sensitive field, it would furnish an almost
automatic task of applying mechanical formula and would hardly call for
the labors of Marshall or Taney, of Holmes or Cardozo. To look for such

6

Legal Realism,
early 1940s,

which reached its peak in the 1930s and

argued that contradictory and conflicting

decisions pervade the law:
Judicial decision making is not and cannot be
fashioned from logical deduction. The realist
claims that formalism must fail because of the
limits of our language and logic and the
indeterminacy of moral and normative concepts.
Under this view, concepts are not embedded in
nature but are merely conventions of social
life... Words are created, defined, and applied by
people saturated by their social conditions and
historical context. Each act of judicial
interpretation is therefore an act of social
choice. To truly understand what underlies
judicial decision making, we are bound to look at
the behavior of judges and not at abstract legal
argument.
So,

if we are to validate any claim that both Holmes

and Frankfurter stood as primary examples of a realist
philosophy,

it is incumbent upon us that we examine their

performance as adjudicators,

recognizing the arguable fact

that neither of these men stood irrevocably in the realist
camp.

Based on such a judgment,

and predicated upon my

belief that by its very nature Realism necessitates an
awareness of the "social

context" within which a decision is

talismanic formula is to assume that the broad guarantees of the
Constitution can fulfill their purpose without the nourishment of
history."
^ For a ccnprehensive examination of the history of Legal Realism,
see Edward Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1973), P. 74-94.
®Raymond A. Belliotti, Justifying Law (Phi 1adelphi a :Tenpl e
University Press, 1992) P. 7.

7

made,

I have chosen individuals who were surely conscious of

their social

responsibility,

cognizant of their legal

but were also at all times

obligations as well.

Neither man

saw himself as a free-wheeling dispenser of the societal
good.

Both balanced his performance on the Supreme Court

between social need and Constitutional

supremacy.

The law of

the land remained for each the central point out of which
decision making would emanate. Max Lerner argues:
Accordingly, he favored exercising the judicial
power only where there was an obvious abuse of
national power or an encroachment of function by
the national government or one of its branches,
and (with respect for the states) only when there
was a real danger of the serious dislocation of
the federal system".

Both Holmes and Frankfurter served on the Court at
times in which concept innovation flourished.
concerns the issue of civil
faithful

liberties,

But as it

they often remained

to a more "conservative" stance.

Their decisions

were often less characteristic of the social
more those of the controlled interlocutor,

innovator,

and

the individual

who sought first to protect what he saw as the maintenance
of the nation's survival.
Oliver Wendell Holmes the mentor,
the willing novitiate,

and Felix Frankfurter

are the subjects of this examination.

^Max Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes. (New York: The
M o d e m Library, 1943), P. 127.

They were men of their particular century,

but in many ways

represented points of view that make them anything but
paradigmatic.

It is that sense of what represents the

responsibility of a Supreme Court

justice which joined them

and it is in their work where it may be found.

CHAPTER

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,

2

THE MENTOR JOINS THE COURT

The year 1902 marked the appointment of Oliver Wendell
Holmes to the Supreme Court of the United States.
sixty-one years of age,

He was

with a personal history that

encompassed thousands of cases decided during his tenure on
the Massachusetts Court from 1882 to 1902.
Holmes's selection by President Theodore Roosevelt was
clearly in line with the precedent which has been
established over America's history.

Presidents continue to

chose members of the Court who represent their own political
philosophies.
reasons.

Roosevelt had selected Holmes for several

Firstly,

of Massachusetts,

with the retirement of Justice Howard Gray
it appeared that the choice of another

Massachusetts man to replace him was appropriate. Max Lerner
says of Roosevelt:
He was attracted by the combination of the scholar
with a distinguished military career, and the
statesman with a literary and historical bent...
He was attracted also by Holmes's high reputation
for legal ability and learning. And as for the
dissents which Holmes had returned in the labor
cases and which had brought down upon him the
contumely of the men of substance, Roosevelt was
not one to balk at that.

^Max Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, (New York'.The
M o d e m Library, 1943), P. xxxi.
9

10

Theodore Roosevelt's major concern was whether Holmes,
a man he believed was surely a nationalist,

would

consistently keep in mind "his relations with his fellow
statesmen who in other branches of the government are
s t r i v i n g ... to advance the ends of government."* It would
appear that further inquiry into Judge Holmes's political
philosophy eventually satisfied the President of his
qualifications.
a political

Trust busting was in the air,

realist,

and Roosevelt,

recognized that it was in his best

interests that he accept the inevitable forces of political
change while also attempting to stay in command. His choice
of Holmes reflected the desire that the man he selected was
"sane and sound on the great national policies." Satisfied
that he was right, Oliver Wendell Holmes was nominated by
the President and quickly approved by the United States
Senate.
The early days of Holmes's tenure were surely a great
disappointment for Roosevelt.
which is recognizable in Mr.
predictability.

That characteristic quality
Justice Holmes was his lack of

The persistently individualized stature

which would find its reflection in many of the positions
Holmes would take in his years on the Supreme Court will be
dealt with in a later chapter, but suffice it to say, Holmes
was to display his own jurisprudential

hbid.

perspective,

and in

its particular quality it would defy categorization.

In 1913

in a speech given at a diner of the Harvard Law School
Association of New York, Holmes said:
It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious
or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other
prematurely into the law, and forgets that what
seem to him to be first principles are believed by
half his fellow men to be w r o n g ... Judges are apt
to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need
something of Mep h i s t o p h e l e s . We too need education
in the obvious--to learn to transcend our own
convictions and to leave room for much that we
hold dear to be done away with short of revolution
by the orderly change of law.
Holmes was not

always an unmistakably "political"

member of the Court. He would argue for change,

and position

himself against it. He was also not a man who felt himself
and his fellow jurists omnipotent:
I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several states. For one in
my place sees how often a local policy prevails
with those who are not trained to national views
and how often action is taken that embodies what
the Commerce Clause was meant to end. But I am not
aware that there is any serious desire to limit
the Court's power in this regard.
For most of the things that properly can be called
evils in the present state of the law I think the
main remedy, as for the evils of public opinion,
is for us to grow more civilized.

A Republican Roosevelt would find his reflection some

3Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Ccrrpany, 1920), P. 295
10 Ibid. P. 296
11

12

thirty five years
family.

later in another member of the Roosevelt

Franklin Roosevelt,

a Democrat,

would also discover

that he couldn't definitively predict the political behavior
of his Supreme Court selections.

He too would come to

realize that more than simply political

expediency would

determine the decisions of certain of his Supreme Court
nominees.

It is important to note that Theodore Roosevelt

was not entirely

sure that Holmes's could be

relied upon to

always make what

in the President's judgment

would bethe

most politically expeditious choices.

In 1901,

just a year

prior to his confirmation, Holmes had spoken on the
anniversary of the day on which John Marshall
seat as Chief Justice.

had taken his

There is no doubt that this speech

radiated respect and reverence, but in Holmes's words we
perhaps may find a better understanding first of his
humility,

and more importantly of his personal views as they

related to the position he would soon hold:
A great man
represents a great ganglion in the
nerves of society, or, to vary
the figure, a
strategic point in the campaign of history, and
part of his greatness consists in his being
there... When we celebrate Marshall we celebrate
at the same time and indivisibly the inevitable
fact that the oneness of the nation and the
supremacy of the national Constitution were
declared to govern the dealings of man with man by
the judgments and decrees of the most august
courts.

11 Ibid. P. 268

13

So how may we adequately define this

judge whom we may

also consider a "great ganglion" in his own right? It is in
attempting to understand that particular philosophy which
influenced his decision making on the Supreme Court that a
clearer picture of Oliver Wendell Holmes may emerge.
Ronald Dworkin argues that Holmes wrote like a dream.
The Justice's personal

conversion from the position that the

First Amendment must be limited to a Blackstonian
disapprobation of prior restraint to a radically changed
view that it must be understood as a much more abstract and
general

principle, was a turning point in American

Constitutional history.

According to Dworkin, most of

Holmes's epigrams were representative of only very lazy
thoughts,

and his philosophical pretensions were almost

always characteristic of an unsophisticated,
form of skepticism.

They were,

in fact,

deeply cynical

embarrassing.

But to agree that such criticism has any validity,

17

we must

fail to adequately recognize the scholar who in 1881 wrote:
The law embodies the story of a nation's
evelopment through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is we must know what it has been, and
what it tends to become, we must alternately
consult history and existing theories of
1egis l a t i o n .

Ronald Dworkin, "Unenxmerated Rights: Whether and Hew Roe Should
Be Overruled", in ed. Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard A. Epstein and Cass R.
Sunstein, The Bill of Rights in the Modem State (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), P. 392

14

But the most difficult labor will be to understand
the combination of the two into new products at
every stage. The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes,
with what is then understood to be convenient, but
its form and machinery, and the degree to which it
is able to work out desired results, depend very
much upon the past.
The point of view which defined the career of Mr.
Justice Holmes,

and which it is reasonable to argue was what

made him so vitally significant to the history of the
Supreme Court,

represented a combination of historical

understanding,

recognition of existing theories of

legislation and the desire that they might combine and
produce something new and more importantly appropriate to
their time in history.

Here was a man who remained

intellectually active on into the last days of his tenure on
the Court.

An openness to knowledge,

and a scholarly desire

for exposure to the ideas of others is eloquently exhibited
in the correspondence between the judge and Harold L a s k i .
L a s k i , a friend of the still very young,
Frankfurter,
1916.

Felix

was introduced to Holmes in the early days of

This relationship continued to reflect Laski's

earliest correspondence and remained an obvious source of
personal

and intellectual

he so honored.

growth for both Laski and the man

The words of the brilliant,

budding teacher

^Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Caiman Law, (Boston: Little
Broun S Carpany: Copyrights 1881, 1909,1923 by Oliver Wendell Holmes) p.
2-3

15

and intellectual define how he saw the man who was the
mentor of his friend Felix Frankfurter,

"I do not say

'thank

you'-- not merely because it is inadequate but because from
one's master one learns that it is simply duty to receive.
You teach our generation how we may hope to l i v e . T h e
dialogue Laski shared with Holmer, continued on into the very
last days of the Justice's life.
In his foreword to Mark DeWolfe Howe's compilation of
these extraordinarily telling letters,
stranger to this very special

Felix Frankfurter,

relationship,

no

noted that

Holmes and Laski were obviously men apart. Much about them
would seem to have inevitably kept them apart,
reasons of divergence,

antecedents,

age,

but the

preoccupations and

geography were ameliorated by the joining of their feeling
for one another and by the intensity and depth of their
intellectual

interests.^

Frankfurter,

perhaps far better than most,

enjoyed a

relationship with Holmes that spanned many of the years
Justice Holmes sat on the Supreme Court.

The undeniable

influence of the older man on who and what this willing
"novitiate" would one day become is reflected not only in

^^Holmes -Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and
Harold J. Laski, Edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, With a Foreward by Felix
Frankfurter (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953)

^ Ibid., P. xvi

16

the metamorphosis that would take place in the younger,
strongly liberal Frankfurter,

but would find a surprising

mirror in his behavior as a justice of the Supreme Court.
In light of Mr. Dworkin's remarks,

and attempting to

arrive at a judgement as to how Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes can be appropriately understood,

it appears

worthwhile that we look at some of the diversity of view
that exists regarding his judicial philosophy.
Examining the transformation that has characterized
constitutional

interpretation and judicial power in America,

Christopher Wolfe says that the end of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth centuries saw a dramatic
change in the understanding of judicial power that prevailed
in the legal profession and among legal scholars.

The new

understanding was fostered by a variety of developments-the rise of legal positivism,
jurisprudence,

and legal

In his chapter,

historicism,

sociological

realism.^

"The Judge as Legislator for Social

Welfare," Wolfe comments that Holmes was undoubtedly the
great prophet and patriarch of the new judicial power. He
says that it is difficult to communicate a sense of the
extraordinary tributes offered to Holmes from a wide variety
of sources.

The reason for all these encomiums is best

^ Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of M o d e m Judicial Review, (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1986) P. 4

17

explained by two factors.
significance,
appreciated.

The first,

and of lesser

is one that Holmes himself would have
The judgment of history has followed Holmes's

own. The judge's positions on the great issues before the
Supreme Court in the first part of the twentieth century,
specifically in the areas of economic regulation and free
speech,

have been adopted by the Court and serve as the

basis for most modern constitutional

law.

The second factor is a much deeper theoretical victory
gained by Holmes. He has shaped more modern thought on the
nature of law and the judicial process than any other
American.
oriented,

17

Holmes is the exponent of an historically

constitutionally centered realism,

and referring

to Missouri v H o l l a n d , Wolfe sees Justice Holmes's point of
view as, at worst,

that constitutional

mistakes" that had disintegrated.
developed and to receive an

provisions were "dead

At best,

they needed to be

'improved form,' more in accord
JO

with what this country had become.

Emerging as a

"conservative" innovator, Holmes was aware that
constitutional

law can avoid the problems of the rigidity or

inflexibility of written documents, which are difficult to
change through formal processes such as amendments.
occurrences might be minimized,

11Ibid.., P. 223-224
U Ibid., P. 228

Such

virtually eliminated by

18

having forms so broad as to be adaptable to all necessary
rules.

19

Modern constitutional

law rests on the

interpretation of certain key constitutional
are thought of as formal

provisions that

enough to provide judges with the

opportunity to lay down an appropriate rule for any
circumstance.

Limitations on judges are a matter of s e l f -

res t r a i n t . Not specifically seen as constitutional
90

1imi tati o n s .

As one attempts to draw closer to the essence of
Justice Holmes's

legal philosophy,

it becomes ever more

clear that he was anything but always predictable.

For some,

the very contradictory nature of his performance on the
Supreme Court was what has made him so significant.
were contradictions in his philosophy,

If there

they were joined with

a belief that lines must be drawn only in the event of
extreme circumstances.

If morality is only a check on force,

Holmes would nevertheless spend his life in underlining the
value of courage,

of truth and of tolerance.

His response to

critics would have been that life is too short,

and is full

of contradictions,^ and it is on the grounds of his
overriding skepticism that Justice Holmes is often

19Ibzd., P. 228
20 Ibid., P. 229
22Francis Biddle, Mr. Justice Holmes. (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1942) P. 127
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criticized.
Holmes's

Francis Biddle provides a wonderful

insight into

legal philosophy when he includes in the early

pages of his study of the Justice,

a quotation that had

apparently been importantly marked in Holmes's papers,
dated October 6, 1885.
from Cairds,

Social

and

Biddle suggests that this quotation

Philosophy and Religion of Comte must

have struck the judge as curiously satisfying.

It offered a

bridge between his doubts as to the value of all ultimates,
and his faith in life and his traditions and aspirations as
an integral part of that life on the other.
Perhaps,

17

if we are to better understand Mr. Holmes,

must take cognizance of these words which seem to have so
strongly influenced both his philosophy and his
jurisprudence:
All criticism of the whole system of things to
which we belong is, from a truly 'relative' point
of view, irrational. For the critic, and the
standard by which he criticizes, cannot be
separated from that system...It has often been
pointed out that a logical skepticism cannot be
universal ... Doubt must rest on a basis of
certitude, or it will destroy itself. But it is
not less true, though it is less frequently
noticed, that all criticism of the world, while it
detects evil in particular, implies an ultimate
optimism. For, if such criticism pretends to be
more than the utterance of the tastes and wishes
of an individual, it must claim to be the
expression of an objective principle--a principle
which, in spite of all appearances to the
contrary, is realizing itself in the world.

“ Ibid., P. 13
11 Ibid. P. 13

we
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Returning again to Christopher Wolfe's estimate of
Holmes,

we may find more on the subject of the justice's

alleged skepticism.

Holmes as a legal positivist,

hostile to the very notion of natural
the doctrine of natural

law,

was very

law. He believed that

that concept which argued that

there were certain principles objectively knowable and valid
always and everywhere,

was merely a result of men's

confusing the familiar with the necessary. Holmes had
applied this skepticism as much to economics as he did to
moral

philosophy or metaphysics.
The role of a judge was not to enforce the natural

He must enforce the positive law,
Judicial

review,

law.

the laws made by men.

as Holmes saw it, was the enforcement of

the most fundamental positive law,

the Constitution.

In a

case where the issue dealt with enforcing a very vague
constitutional provision,

such as due process, Holmes would

argue that the Court should be very slow to strike down
legislative acts. After all,
what did (or did not)

the legislature's notions as to

constitute arbitrary action were as

likely to be right as the judges'.

Judicial

review was

appropriate only when legislation deprived citizens, without
any rational basis,

of rights that were fundamental

accepted by virtue of tradition. Where traditional

and
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understanding of fundamental

rights was at issue, the judge

must defer to the legislature.^
So we have now been introduced to Holmes the
positivist,
the skeptic,

Holmes the constitutionalist,
etc.

And, we may find in the work of Thomas C.

Grey yet another Mr. Holmes,
pragmatist,

the historicist,

and that is Holmes the

the man who was capable of resolving the

disparate elements in his philosophy and combining them to
create a coherent whole.
Robert W. Gordon's reading of Grey's point of view
indicates that he had once been inclined to see Holmes's
positivism,

his formalism and conceptualist projects as

representing unresolved contradictions with his historicism.
He has,

however,

convincingly reconciled the two through

imputing to Holmes a pragmatic move.

It seems reasonable to

believe that for the sake of making the lawyer's task of
finding and applying doctrine easier, Holmes had indeed been
determined to refine the classification scheme,
arrangement of doctrine into conceptual

the logical

categories.

In this

sense he was a c o n c e p t u a l i s t . He was also a formalist,

in

the sense of seeking decision rules that would increase
legal

certainty by generating predictable results.

His historicism told him that a large part of the law in any
period would consist of the contingent and irrational.

‘^S'upra. Note 16., P. 161
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Conceptual

categories could never be more than provisional

aids to help practitioners sort out the cases, guidelines
for decisions,

starting points for legal

reasoning.

They

could never reguire any particular results.^
David Burton would have us understand that it is
"artificial" to attempt to study Holmes's
from his politics.
the two.

jurisprudence away

There is a necessary "symbiosis" between

The judge's well-known advocacy of judicial

restraint was analogous to an abiding respect for the will
of legislatures,

whether they spoke for the people of a

state or the citizens of the United States.

Holmes was

clearly a republican--a man who respected the the work of an
elective body, but was only interested in interfering with
its procedures in the most extreme circumstances.^
It is in the lack of agreement,

in the plethora of

opinion that one finds concerning this enigmatic judge where
he must hopefully emerge.

Felix Frankfurter speaks well to

the necessity that our understanding of Holmes be predicated
upon that very diversity which characterizes

our subject.

In a book written by this man who would ultimately
prove himself the willing acolyte of Oliver Wendell Holmes,

"Introduction: Holmes Shadow", ed. Robert W. Gordon .The Legacy of
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr.(Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1992) P. 9-10
^David H. Burton, Political Ideas of Justice Holmes. ( New
Jersey,London and Toronto::Associated University Presses, 1992) P. 103
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Jr.,

there surfaces a picture surprisingly similar to that

which would later be used to define the writer as well:
These instances must suffice to show the different
considerations that determined Mr. Justice Holmes'
mind when he sat in judgement on legislation
attempting economic readjustments as against
legislation restricting freedom of utterance. Just
as he would allow experiments in economics which
he himself viewed with doubt and distrust, so he
would protect speech that offended his taste and
wisdom. At bottom, both attitudes came from a
central faith and a governing skepticism. Since
the whole of truth has not yet been, and is not
likely to be, brought up from its bottomless well,
the first duty of an educated man was to doubt his
major premise even while he continued to act on
it. This was the skeptical conviction with which
he distrusted dogma, whether economic or
intellectual. But his was never the paralyzing
skepticism which easily becomes comfortable or
corroding cynicism.
An examination of Holmes's record on the Supreme Court
may hope to find a better understanding of that philosophy
which would effect his often disparate decisions.

It seems

unfair to relegate his actions to the realm of "cynicism"
without understanding that the skeptic,

the person who is

aware that doubt is the provence of the truly wise, must
make his choices with greater honesty,

with greater

humility.

•)7

-'Felix Frankfurter, Mr.Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938) P. 61-62

Contradiction is not always a sign of vacillation.

It can

also demand a strength of character and an individuality
which rarely pleases all. We remember the non-conformist.
The ordinary gets lost in the crowd.

CHAPTER 3

HOLMES AND THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Oliver Wendell Holmes,
generation.

Jr. was the product of a

The contradictory character that often pervaded

his decision making,
"growing” phenomenon,

if examined as the result of a
may be more appropriate to a better

understanding of the man as both an individual
of the Supreme Court of the United States.

and a member

That

inconsistency we find in Holmes decisions is in fact
consistent with the social philosophy he brought to the
Court,

and even more importantly with the ideas that

pervaded the "indefinite" world that produced his personal
history.
beings,

All of us are influenced by our beginnings.
their roots,

Human

the intellectual milieu in which they

develop and the society that contributes the earliest
foundations for a worldview are inextricably interrelated.
Holmes's

legal philosophy is clearly the result of such a

" v i s i t ."a

^ Written in 1917,"The Love Seng of J.Alfred Prufrock", T.S.
Elliot's masterpiece of poetic history speaks eloquently to the world in
which Holmes developed. "'Let us go then, you and I, When the evening is
spread out against the sky...To lead you to an overwhelming
question...Oh do not ask, 'What is it?’ Let us go and make our visit."
25
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Born in the "developmental" years of the 19th century
in America,

Justice Holmes was a man who had known the

horrors of a Civil War that threatened not only his personal
world but the stability of his nation.
ugliness,

Surviving the

he had returned to the home of his upper class

Brahman father to study law at Harvard and beyond this
fortuitous decision,

to ply his trade as an attorney in a

world alive with change. America in the latter years of the
19th century provided the seedbed for the philosophy of a
Ralph Waldo Emerson,

a Henry David Thoreau and a John Dewey.

The worldview that pervades the work of such as these,
also characterizes the words of the ever curious
intellectual who in 1915 wrote for the Illinois Law Review:
To get a little nearer to the practical our
current ethics and our current satisfaction with
conventional legal rules, it seems to me, can be
purged to a certain extent without reference to
what our final ideal may be. To rest upon a
formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means
death...To doubt o n e ’s own principles is the mark
of a civilized man. To know what you want and why
you think that such a measure will help it is the
first but by no means the last step towards
intelligent legal reform.
The "revolt against formalism" which Morton White
examines is the social movement which colors the legal
philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
19th century,

0Q

Jr. He speaks of the

that century which had transcended the 18th

“ See Holmes, "Ideals and Doubts, ” Illinois Law Review, vol. X,
(1915) p. 3
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through its concern with change, process,

history and

culture.

This was the century of history,

evolutionary

biology,

psychology and sociology,

and economics.

historical

jurisprudence

It was also the century of Comte,

Hegel, Marx and Spencer.

It is not surprising,

Darwin,

therefore,

that we find American intellectuals in the eighteen
nineties,

positioning themselves against

they had been convinced that logic,
mathematics,

formalism,

abstraction,

since

deduction,

and mechanics were inadequate to social

research and incapable of containing the rich, moving,
living current of social

life.^

It is difficult for one who studies Holmes not to
recognize a multiplicity of facets. Here was surely more
than simply a student of the law. Holmes is better
understood,

as Judge Richard A. Posner would volunteer,

"writer-philosopher" in the vein of Nietzsche,
interestingly had been Holmes's contemporary.

as a

a man who
The Justice's

attitudes were often not far from Sarte or Heidegger,

also

men who emerged from the metamorphosis of the late 19th
century.

One finds in studying Holmes's,

pragmatism,

utilitarianism,

liberalism, materialism,
militarism,

biological,

atheism,

(nineteenth century)

aestheticism,
social,

allusions to

utilitarianism,

and historical

Darwinism,

^Morton White, Social Thought In America (Boston: Beacon Press,
1968) P. 11
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skepticism,

nihilism,

power," Calvinism,
behaviorism,

Nietzschean vitalism and "will

logical positivism,

and existentialism.

to

stoicism,

Together with these is the

explicit rejection of most of these

'isms' and a sheer zest

for living that may be the central plank in the Holmesian
p i a t f o r m .^
As one acquaints oneself with Holmes"s predecessors,

we

are surprised to find many of his insights and even
expressions anticipated. With power and ingenuity Holmes
synthesized,

reformulated,

and extended the ideas and

expression of those who had gone before him.
In his famous essay,

"The Path

17

of The Law," a Harvard

Law Review article written in March

of 1897, Holmes was

surely the scholar in search of the

truth. He was the

skeptical

in the steps of men

philosopher often walking

David Hume.

Choosing not to pontificate,

like

he was rather the

humble student trying to find his way back along the path
law had taken,

a path that had led to a specific point in

its history. Here was a man of the law who would pursue such
a road for the remainder of his long life:

the rational study of law is still to a large
extent the study of history. History must be a
part of the study, because without it we cannot

^*Richard A . Posner(ed. )The Essential Holmes,(Chicago: Universi ty
of Chicago Press, 1992),Intro. P. xix-xx

^ I bid., P. xii
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know the precise scope of the rules which it is
our business to know. It is a part of the rational
study, because it is the first step toward an
enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a
deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those
rul es .33

Holmes's seminal book,
1881,

The Common L a w , published in

was not the work of a pedant. Here again is another

"skeptical"

journey. He would have us look at the past so

that perhaps we might

find some indicators as to how to

better anticipate the future:
The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order
to know what it is, we must know what it has been
and what it tends to become. We must alternately
consult history and existing theories of
legislation. But the most difficult labor will be
to understand the combination of the two into new
products at every stage.
Any attempt toward defining Mr.

Justice Holmes,

and

tying together the multiplicity of views to be found in the
literature with reference to this man, necessarily requires
that the researcher find his or her personal path toward the
truth.

Scholarly debate with regard to this enigmatic

individual has raged from the time of his earliest days on
the bench on into the present moment. His belief that truth

" S e e H o l m e s , "The Path of The L a w , " Harv a r d Law
Revjiew, Vol. X, March 25, 1897, P. 469
^ H o l m e s , The Common L a w (Boston: Little, Brown,
18 8 1 )p.1
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was a changing issue is what often makes his categorization
im possible.
John Dewey speaks well to the need that change must be
endemic to human thought. How much like Holmesian philosophy
are his words:
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that
the function of mind is to project new and more
complex ends--to free experience from routine and
from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish
purposes already given either in the mechanism of
the body or in that of the existent state of
society, but the use of intelligence to liberate
and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.
Action restricted to given and fixed ends may
attain great technical efficiency; but efficiency
is the only quality to which it can lay claim.
Such action is mechanical (or becomes so), no
matter what the scope of the performed end, be it
the Will of God or Kultur.
But the doctrine that intelligence develops within
the sphere of action for the sake of possibilities
not yet given is the opposite of a doctrine of
mechanical efficiency. Intelligence as
intelligence is inherently forward-looking; only
by ignoring its primary function does it become a
mere means for an end already given. The latter is
servile, even when the end is labeled moral,
religious or aesthetic. But action directed to
ends to which the agent has not previously been
attached inevitably carries with it a quickened
and enlarged spirit. A pragmatic intelligence is a
creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic.
Morton White writes,

that Holmes and Veblen both

believed that law and economics were empirical sciences.
They wanted to be free of prejudice and belief in final

^ " T h e Nee d for a Recovery of P h i l o s o p h y , " Creative
Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic A t t i t u d e . by John
Dewey and others (New York: Holt, 1917) p . 63-64
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causes;

wishing to make a distinction between what they

found and what they wanted to find. The same distinction
invariably turns up in Holmes's writing,

particularly in his

conception of legal duty and in his perception of the law
itself.

A scientist was expected to describe what happened

even when he disliked it
In a speech at the banquet of the Middlesex Bar
Association given in December of 1902,
entitled,

which he had

"Twenty Years in Retrospect," Holmes's own words

may hopefully guide us toward a better insight into his
legal philosophy:
I have tried to see the law as an organic whole. I
also have tried to see it as a reaction between
tradition on the one side and the changing desires
and needs of the community on the other. I have
studied tradition in order that I might understand
how it came to be what it is, and to estimate its
worth with regard to our present needs; and my
references to the Year Books often have had a
skeptical end.
I have considered the present tendencies and
desires of society and have tried to realize that
its different portions want different things, and
that my business was to express not my personal
wish, but the resultant, as nearly as I could
guess, of the pressure of the past and the
conflicting wills of the present.
I have considered the social and economic
postulates on which we frame the conception of our
needs, and I have to see them in dry light. It has
seemed to me that certainty is an illusion, that
we have few scientific data on which to affirm
that one rule rather than another has the sanction
of the universe, that we rarely could be sure that

36I d. at 31, p. 206
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one tends more distinctly than its opposite to the
survival and welfare of the society where it is
practiced, and that the wisest are but blind
guides.
Studying

Mr.

Justice Holmes,

the issue one must

continually confront is the fact that it
to stand on political

common ground with this man. His

prejudices were clearly his own,

and it is not our interest

here to judge

the rightness or wrongness

view on every

issue.

If awareness is what we are after,
recognize that his obvious sexism,
elitism,

is not always easy

of his point of

then we must

his clear intellectual

his ties with an economic philosophy that would

conjoin industrial

growth and the economic good of all are

not necessarily always one's own. The study of this
particular individual must relate more importantly to the
service he has rendered the development of American
jurisprudence.

Holmes was the child of a period.

The fin de

si eele that defined the later years of the 19th and the
early years of the 20th century was the intellectual milieu
that produced such an individual.

It placed its imprint on

who and what he would become:
If our imagination is strong enough to accept the
vision of ourselves as parts inseverable from the
rest, and to extend our final interest beyond the
boundary of our skins, it justifies the sacrifice
even of our lives for ends outside of ourselves.
The motive, to be sure, is the common wants and

37 Icf. at 31. p. 151
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ideals that we find in man. Philosophy does not
furnish motives, but it shows men that they are
not fools for doing what they already want to do.
It opens to the forlorn hopes on which we throw
ourselves away, the vista of the farthest stretch
of human thoughts, the chords of harmony that
breathes from the unknown.

Oliver Wendell Holmes,
R e v i e w , p. 40 (1918)

"Natural L a w , " 32 Harvard Law

CH A P T E R 4

FRANKFURTER,

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF HIS TEACHER

The year 1939 saw Franklin Roosevelt's nomination of
Felix Frankfurter to fill the seat vacated by the death of
Justice Cardozo.

Joseph Lash tells us that in Frankfurter's

account of his appointment he went to great lengths to
portray himself as a man who was happy at Harvard,
thought he might succeed Cardozo,

had no

and who, when in October

was told by Franklin Roosevelt that he had promised the next
appointment to West,

accepted it in good spirits and

objectively appraised for Roosevelt,
do,

as he had asked him to

the qualifications of other men who were being

p r o p o s e d .^
Frankfurter had enjoyed a colorful political
apprenticeship prior to his sudden choice by President
Roosevelt.

Hardly a newcomer to political

served as personal

life, he had

assistant to Henry L. Stimson only a

short time after being graduated by Harvard Law School
1906. This political

in

"plum" was surely worthy of the still

very young and brilliant attorney,

but the route he had

taken to that moment had been highly fortuitous.

1Q

" Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. "A
Biographical Essay" : Published by Joseph P. Lash, 1975. P. 63
34
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Born November 15,
Hapsburg Empire,

1882 in the closing years of the

Felix Frankfurter emigrated with his family

to America in 1894.

Jewish immigrants on New York's lower

East Side confronted a world that was antithetical

to the

wealthy and prestigious Boston that had earlier nurtured
Oliver Wendell Holmes.

But Emma Frankfurter,

his mother,

tyrannized her husband Leopold and for many years had
dominated her son.

She had been determined that, despite

Leopold's lack of business talent,

the family would make it

out of the ghetto and into the middle class. Within five
years,

the Frankfurters had moved uptown to Yorkville,

and

Frankfurter had discovered that academic achievement could
provide him his own road toward upward m o b i l i t y . ^
A New York City public school

education took

Frankfurter next to City College in 1901,

and from there to

Harvard Law School. At Harvard he imbibed the spirit of John
Gray's brand of legal skepticism,
later be called "legal

a precursor of what would

realism." Holmes had argued as early

as 1881 in his Lowell Lectures that the life of the law was
experience,
legal

not logic,

and Gray explored the various non-

factors that affected judicial decision making.^

^Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter. Judicial Restraint and
Individual Liberties (Boston:Twayne Publishers, 1991)
41I b i d P .

2
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As research assistant to John Chipman Gray,

Frankfurter

led his class for three years, made the Harvard Law Review,
and was graduated in 1905,

and it was a letter from Gray

that introduced him to Oliver Wendell H o l m e s . ^ The time he
spent at Harvard established Frankfurter's sense of self,
and gave him the opportunity to walk in the paths of a
Brahman culture that affected the course of his future life,
and H.N. Hirsch points out that the law as taught at Harvard
would become the object of the judge's energies,
the root of his pride.

as well as

They would become an immensely

important source of his self esteem as well.

Equally

important, Harvard had offered an environment that allowed
him to break the bounds of his culture and gain acceptance
from the American establishment,

which was thus far had been

so foreign to h i m .^
The justice's short experience in private law practice
ended only a year later when he joined Henry Stimson in the
U.S. A t t o r n e y ’s office in New York.
Washington in 1911,

Following Stimson to

the young lawyer, not yet thirty,

embarked upon personal notations in a diary that would
record a life in law and public service that spanned the
next half

century.

4LH.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (New York: Basic
Books Inc., 1981) P.21
43 Ibid., P. 21
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Stimson,

a representative of that "Yankee" culture

which Frankfurter had encountered at Harvard,
major touchstone for the judge's career.

became the

It was in

Washington where Frankfurter would develop a real
relationship with Oliver Wendell Holmes.

In Harlan B.

Phillips compilation of recorded talks with Felix
Frankfurter,

who was then a renowned Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States,

a highly significant piece of

personal memorabilia surfaces:
Apart from my own chief, Secretary Stimson, the
great friendship I formed with a person of an
older generation was Mr. Justice Holmes. I had a
note of introduction to him from a great griend
who was a professor of mine at the Harvard Law
School. We soon became fast friends, and I became
a regular visitor at his home. A regular visitor
at his house meant that you sat in front of the
fire when there was a fire, and sat in his study
when there wasn't a fire, and he did practically
all the talking. He was probably the best talker-not the greatest talker in volume, but you just
d i d n ’t think of talking when he talked because it
was such a wonderful stream of exciting flow of
ideas in words.
In Washington,
Secretary of War,

working closely with Stimson,

then

Frankfurter suddenly found himself

searching for a new path, when with the election of Woodrow
Wilson in 1912,

Stimson returned to private law practice.

Not enamored of practicing law, Frankfurter agreed to accept

^Harlen B. Phillips, Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (Reynal &
Ccrrpany, Inc., 1960) P. 58
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a position on the faculty at Harvard,

but the advent of the

First World War changed his plans.
Harlan Phillips notes that when Frankfurter finally
returned to Harvard in the fall of 1919, he was far
different

from the man he'd been when he left.

was still

a "wunderkind," the bright young law school

graduate who had been Mr.
well

In 1917 he

Stimson's assistant and was also

connected to the literary and political

intellectuals

of the House of Truth and The New R e p u b l i c . Progressive
politics had been a great

"game" for Frankfurter. He had

been a firsthand witness to the insidious bigotry directed
at suspected radicals and the hatred between labor and
management.
War,

Having been not only an aide to the Secretary of

but an important figure in his own right in an effort

to mobilize American resources

for the war, Frankfurter had

been an eyewitness to the drama at Paris and had played a
key role in moving the Zionist dream closer to reality.

The

young man from the "other side" had been tested under very
trying circumstances and had succeeded brilliantly in his
e f f o r t s .^
Back at Harvard in 1919,

Felix Frankfurter continued to

be anything but politically indifferent.

Bridging the gap

between the conservatism of his Brahman idols and the

^ Supra, Note 40., P. 19
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liberalism of those who adamantly defended Sacco and
Vanzetti,

we find here a man who in the years preceding his

selection to serve on the United States Supreme Court
maintained a stance which kept him "balancing" between these
two ideological positions.
Although he recognized that the system could be
perverted by the abuse of prosecutorial

and judicial power,

Frankfurter never abandoned his faith in its essential
rightness.

Despite the charges of his supposed radicalism,

Frankfurter's basic conservatism is clear.

Only by clinging

to the law as an instrument of reason and justice could
society be saved from the turmoil

of prejudice and

revolution .^
As a man who was student,

teacher and inevitably maker

of law, Felix Frankfurter during the 1920's developed a
legal point of view that would find its fullest development
in the years he spent on the Supreme Court.
Holmes rejected a formalistic, mechanical

Frankfurter like

approach to the

law. He didn't see law as a fixed body of eternal verities,
but as a set of ideas responding to the changing times.
The legal realists had taught him that

judges respond as men

rather than machines in determining the law, and the
conservative bloc of the Supreme Court showed him how
dangerous this response could be.
46Ibid., P. 25
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Brandeis had also influenced Frankfurter's commitment to law
as an agency of reform--but always operating in conjunction
with the elective bodies and in accordance with the
essential

principles of the Constitution.^

Archibald Mac Leish spends considerable time speaking
of the relationship enjoyed by Frankfurter and Holmes.
According to this author,

there were two men who most

influenced the thinking of Felix Frankfurter,
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes.

and they were

Speaking

specifically of Holmes, Mac Leish's words provide a
wonderful

insight into the Justice's philosophy and help the

reader to recognize that important thread which ultimately
bound Frankfurter to his renowned predecessor. He says that
with Frankfurter,

and with others of equal

mind and emotion,

the influence of Mr.

exuberance of

Justice Holmes was a

"sovereign prescription." Holmes had seen the law, as few
great

jurists have ever seen it. He was capable of

understanding its relationship to a world which included men
and women,

poetry,

work and war. He saw the pretensions of

the law to final precision as skeptically as he saw the
pretensions of philosophers to ultimate truth or the
pretensions of politicians to disinterested service.
And therefore,

he conceived of, taught and argued that the

law--even the law of the Constitution--must make its own

47 Ibid., P. 32
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adjustments to its time. What Holmes had given his friends,
and Mr. Frankfurter among them, was a conception of the law
as anything but a means to an end. To most great lawyers the
law sooner or later becomes a substantive,

a noun.

For Mr.

Justice Holmes it was always a verb with a predicate to
fol 1ow it
G. Edward White,

in his extensive examination of that

tradition which has been carried forward by American
jurisprudence,

spends considerable time with his study of

Justice Frankfurter.

Clearly not always portraying his

subjects with great admiration, White's examination of the
members of the Warren Court notes their sensitivity to the
implications of status,
intellectual

and one is made aware of that

elitism which Frankfurter may well have carried

away from his early days in front of Mr.

Justice Holmes's

fire.
Frankfurter had been able to reconcile his intellectual
elitism with the idea of democracy using notions of
paternalism and social

responsibility.

He obviously believed

that the masses needed the opportunity to achieve elite
status, but that they could only recognize these
opportunities if educated by an elite.

Public-mindedness was

the obligation that must accompany one's rise in the

^ Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter 19121938. Edited by Archibald MacLeish and E.F. Prichard, Jr., with a
Foreword by Mr. Mac Leish., P. xviii
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meritocracy.

He was representative of a group of early

twentieth-century thinkers who called themselves
"progressives" and who thought that popular sovereignty and
elitism were as easily reconcilable as humanitarianism and
professionalism.

Progressivism had its greatest meaning for

Frankfurter predicated upon his concern that elites use
their privileged status to further rather than block mass
participation in education and politics.

Out of this concern

had come his conception of the limited role of the Supreme
Court. i9
The 1930s were years in which Felix Frankfurter found
himself

involved in both the intellectual

Harvard,

life of the law at

as well as with New Deal politics in Washington.

a professor,

he became mentor to James Landis,

Charles Wyzanski,

Thomas Corcoran and others,

As

Alger Hiss,
students who

he would send to Washington to be part of the Roosevelt
administration.

His relationship with Roosevelt had spanned

the early years of the twentieth century,

and H.N. Hirsch

writes that Frankfurter had first come to know Roosevelt
when both were middle level

functionaries in Washington

during World War I. Roosevelt,
the Navy,

then Assistant Secretary of

often discussed labor matters with Frankfurter,

who was chairman of the War Labor Policies Board.

Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of
Leading American Judges (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988) P. 326-327
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Frankfurter later said--perhaps with a touch of
exaggeration--that they saw or spoke to each other nearly
every day in 1917 and 1918.^
In 1930,

Professor Frankfurter had written to Walter

Lipmann that he would support Roosevelt in his effort toward
becoming president.^ And in Max Freedman's remarkable
compilation of the correspondence between Felix Frankfurter
and Franklin Roosevelt one may draw some real
the relationship that these two men shared.
includes a telegram dated June 19, 1930,

insight into

Freedman

in which

Frankfurter explained to Roosevelt why he had to decline
Governor Ely of Massachusetts's offer to serve on the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts.

Clearly,

other ideas about his potentialities,

Frankfurter had

and history would

provide the result.
What emerges here is not only the definitive importance
Roosevelt found in Frankfurter's advice,

but also the

position Professor Frankfurter held as intermediary between
the President and Justice Louis Brandeis,
center of influence for Frankfurter's

another vital

legal philosophy.

The

then prestigious Harvard professor of the law wanted to pull
the Roosevelt administration toward the position of what has

Supra Note 42., P. 101
to Lippmann, quoted in Freedman, Roosevelt and Frankfurter.
P. 56
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been referred to as Brandeisian liberalism. Walter Lippman
has said that:
Brandeis held an almost mystical aura for
Frankurter and, especially, for Frankfurter's
p r o t e g e s ... They perceived the New Deal as a chance
to finally bring about some of the reforms for
which they had all struggled since the turn of the
c e n t u r y ... The ideological core of Brandeisian
liberalism was its emphasis on sma l l n e s s ...they
sought to restore the simple and decentralized
market economy of the nineteenth century...To the
first New Dealers, business was to be a partner;
to the Brandeisians
business was to be the
enemy.
Reading the correspondence between Frankfurter and
Roosevelt,

it becomes even more evident that Frankfurter

maintained a central
before,

role as advisor to President Roosevelt

during and after Roosevelt's move into the

presidency.
In May of 1935,

on the heels of the Supreme Decision in

Sc h e c t e r . Frankfurter recognized that the first New Deal at
the hands of the then sitting Supreme Court would
necessitate a real shift in Roosevelt's policies.

Although

he disagreed with the President's plan to "pack the Court,"
Frankfurter maintained his loyalty to Roosevelt,

so much so

that he stayed silent and took an active part in Roosevelt's
campaign for re-election.

Philosophically he disagreed with

the President's methodology,

but the relationship they

shared was far more significant for Frankfurter. H.N. Hirsch

^ Supra Note 42., P. 104
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suggests that the Justice's nomination to the Supreme Court
of the United States was in a sense a reward for his loyalty
C9

during the Court-packing fight.
Melvin Urofsky offers an extremely interesting view as
it relates to the perspective Frankfurter brought to his new
position as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States.

As Frankfurter had taught a generation of students

at Harvard how they might see the appropriate role of the
Supreme Court and the limits of its jurisdiction as well, he
would go on to attempt to teach his breathren on the Court.
For 30 years, however,

Frankfurter had been either an

acolyte of men like Holmes,

Brandeis,

Stimson,

and

Roosevelt--or a mentor himself to those he considered his
intellectual

inferiors.

The sitting Court when Frankfurter came to it was not
interested in necessarily following his line of thought.

One

of the great tragedies of Frankfurter's career is that a man
renowned for his talents in personal

relations,

could have

so misread the situation and the characters of those with
whom he would s e r v e .^

^ Si^pra Note 42, P. 124
^ Supra Note 40., P. 46

C HA PT ER 5

FELIX FRANKFURTER:

THE DEFINITION OF AN IDEOLOGY

Both Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes came
to the Supreme Court in their mature years.

Each of them had

developed conclusive opinions as to the place the Court must
hold in American life.

Frankfurter was fifty-seven when in

1939 he assumed his seat on the most prestigious bench in
the American legal system.
A scholar by anyone's standards, Frankfurter had
clearly made his mark as a pre-eminent professor of the law.
Also a man of politics,

here was a new justice who had for

many years found both his hands and mind deeply entrenched
in the workings of American politics.
Roosevelt's friend and advisor,

As Franklin

he was,

although he often

denied it, an important cog in the wheels of New Deal
dynamics,

and not unlike Oliver Wendell Holmes,

words he so often quoted,

Jr., who's

Frankfurter represented an

apparent plus for the policies espoused by the different
"Rooseveltian" administration he had been chosen to serve.
The professor who left Harvard for the bench in 1939 was
generally considered a liberal
radical).

(in some quarters even a

From that point on, for many he became the voice

of conservatism.

If in fact the apparent change occurred,
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its impact upon history was profound. What is significant,
however,

is that Frankfurter's basic outlook did not change.

In private life he was,

and continued to be one of the great

liberals of his day. But it was integral

to his philosophy

that a judge's private convictions are one thing, his duty
on the bench quite another.
As a professor or a judge,
or property,

This was the teaching of Holmes.
whether with respect to liberty

Felix Frankfurter was skeptical

of government

by the judiciary.^
In his writings prior to the January day that he
received the telephone call

from Franklin Roosevelt which

would effect the balance of his life, Frankfurter's words
corroborate a belief that he had already arrived at his own
view of the place the Supreme Court must hold in America's
constitutional

system.

In 1925 he wrote:

The real battles of liberalism are not won on the
Supreme Court. To a large extent the Supreme
Court, under the guise of Constitutional
interpretation of words whose contents are derived
from the disposition of the justices, is the
reflection of that impalpable but controlling
thing, the general drift of public opinion. Only a
persistent positive translation of the liberal
faith into the thoughts and acts of the community
is the real reliance against the unabated
temptation to straight jacket the human mind. 1
’

^Wallace Mendel son, Felix Frankfurter A Tribute (New York:Reynal
& Company, 1964) P. 1-2
^Felix Frankfurter,’’Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?”
New Republic, 17 June 1925. P. 178
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In his prologue to The An t a g o n i s t s . James F. Simon
speaks of the response to Justice Frankfurter's nomination
to the Court.
York Times,

This author notes that according to the New

both liberal Democrats and anti-New Deal

Republicans alike ranked him as one of FDR's most popular
C7

appointments.

As it turned out,

the conservatives were more

prescient in their forecast than the liberals,
Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial
his pervasive guide,

for

restraint proved to be

and his record on civil

liberties,

so

exemplary as a private citizen, would be less impressive as
a justice.
Ironically,
Black,

the former member of the Ku Klux Klan, Hugo

would become the libertarian hero and liberal

of the Court--not Frankfurter.
was exclusively on Frankfurter,

In January 1939,
who,

Holmes before him.
with Holmes

the focus

appropriately,

taking the scholar's seat on the Court,

leader

was

filed by Cardozo and

Like his predecessors,

Frankfurter shared

(who had been his close friend and mentor) a

view of the law as a living,

vital

force that must change

with the t i m e s .^ ■

C7

James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter
and Civil Liberties in America (New York:Simon & Schuster, 1989) P. 17

88Ibid., P. 18
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Once again,

Frankfurter's views as they related to the

function of the Supreme Court and the place of law in modern
society were well defined in his tribute to Justice Jackson:
That law in its comprehending sense is at once the
precondition and, perhaps, the greatest
achievement of an enduring civilization since
without it there is either strife or enslavement
of the spirit of man; that law so conceived
expresses the enforceable insights of morality and
endeavors of justice, that law is not wordjugglery or the manipulation of symbols; that
precedents, while not foreclosing new truths or
enlarged understanding, are not counters to be
moved about for pre-conceived ends; that this
significance and role of aw must particularly be
respected in a continental federal society like
ours.
The Supreme Court as the ultimate voice of the law
must always be humbly mindful of the fact that it
is entrusted with power which is saved from misuse
only by a self-searching disinterestedness almost
beyond the lot of men--these were convictions
Justice Jackson passionately entertained."
For Frankfurter,

and as he so often enunciated,

the

Supreme Court was to serve as only interpreter and protector
of social

policy.

Although the positions he took would in

certain instances be politically controversial,

he brought

to the Court an ever present awareness of the limits of his
position.
Judicial

restraint in his hands meant that the

country's best hope for the protection of its democratic
values lay with the elected branches of government,

not with

^Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Jackscm. " Harvard Law Review,
LXVIII (April, 1955, P. 937-938
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the Supreme Court.

That "disinterestedness" which he had

admired in Jackson was surely his chosen credo. Wallace
Mendelson has characterized Justice Frankfurter in much the
same mode when he says that he was wary of judicial
to impose

justice on the community.

attempts

This was to deprive it

of the wisdom that comes from self-inflicted wounds and the
strength that grows with the burden of responsibility.
the Justice's view,

In

humanitarian ends were served best in

that allocation of function through which people by balance
of power seek their own destiny.

True to the faith upon

which democracy ultimately rested, Frankfurter would leave
to the political processes the onus of building legal
standards.

In the Justice's view,

only that people is free

who chooses for itself when choices must be m a d e . ®
In 1916,
Review,

in an essay written for the Harvard Law

Frankfurter paid tribute to Oliver Wendell Holmes,

and to his mentor's perception of the position of the
Supreme Court.

The essay was full of Holmes's words,

quoting the man he so obviously admired,

and in

Frankfurter

provided an evocation of his own jurisprudencial philosophy:

We touch here the most sensitive spot in our
constitutional system: that its successful working
calls for minds of extraordinary i n t e l l e c t u a l .
disinterestedness and penetration lest limitations
in personal experience and imagination be

^Wallace Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter:Conflict On
The Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) P. 130-131
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interpreted, however conscientiously or
u n c o n s c i o u s l y , as constitutional limitations.61
And then,
wrote:

quoting Justice Holmes directly,

Frankfurter

Great constitutional provisions must be
administered with caution. Some play must be
allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must
be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the cour t s . 62

Although social

responsibility remained the core of

Frankfurter's personal

ideology,

there may well be a clear

connection between his views as they related to the place of
the Court and the lack of uniformity that often pervaded his
judicial

opinions.

Neither a categorical

realist or a

formalist in the sense either is commonly understood,
Frankfurter commingled the two perspectives,

leaving to the

Court the job of serving as the moderating voice between the
public and their representatives.
judicial

The essence of his

restraint maintained that it was not the province

of the Court to make social policy:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its
expression should come from those popularly chosen
to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as
courts are not. The pressure on legislatures to
discharge their responsibility with care,
understanding and imagination should be stiffened,
not relaxed. Above all, they must not be
encouraged in irresponsible or undisciplined use

^ Felix Frankfurter, "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice
Holmes, " Harvard Law Review, 1916, P. 686
621 ;bid., P. 686
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of language. In the keeping of legislatures
perhaps more than any other group is the well
being of their fellow-men.

Frankfurter's appointment to the Court was confirmed
without a dissenting vote on January 17, and on January 30,
1939,

he took his oath to "administer justice without

respect to person." These words echo with a special
as they refer to the Judge,

clarity

but it is in his most

significant opinions where we must look in search of
corroboration for his faithfulness to their essential
meaning.
Helen Shirley Thomas suggests that we view Justice
Frankfurter through his own words as well,
wrote in 1931,

'for all

"As Frankfurter

of us, truth is born when we

discover it. But intellectual genealogy is important.
The history of ideas is essential

to culture;

thereby we are

saved from being intellectually nouveau r i c h e s .'^
But can we discover the "truth" of Felix Frankfurter?
Perhaps it will not be possible to categorize this man who
has been such a disappointment for some and a definitive
example of judicial

accomplishment for others.

reviewer of J, Lash's book,

In 1975,

a

From The Diaries of Felix

£5

Felix Frankfurter, "Same Reflections an the Reading of
Statutes," Columbia Law Review, May, 1947, P. 545-546
^Helen Shirley Thorns, Felix Frankfurter Scholar On The Bench.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960) P. 40
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Frankfurter presented the former view.

For the writer,

Frankfurter had surely been a disappointment:
In light of Felix Frankfurter's brilliant preCourt career, what did the country--and
Frankfurter himself--expect from him on the bench?
What were his role and accomplishments on the
Court? Given Frankfurter's early liberalism, could
one have foreseen, and can we now explain, his
later shift to conservatism? Is there a consistent
philosophical thread between the younger
Frankfurter and the Justice?.. Frankfurter's
unusual combination of scholarship and activism
should have made him a dominating figure on the
Supreme Court, and one who in a period of stress,
would protect the rights of political and
religious minorities. But neither occurred.
Instead, Frankfurter emerged as the paradigm
rationalist, the academics' Justice. His primary
concerns were with regularity, neutrality, and
judicial humility. He deferred to administrative
expertise, the political processes, and stare
d e c i s i s ..
One must wonder whether the man who had served as
counsel

to the NAACP and as an active participant in the

activities of the American Civil Liberties.Union,

as well as

the person who had written the inflammatory book,

The Case

of Sacco and Vanzetti.
defender of civil
liberal

in 1927,

actually remained the

liberties and the passionate devotee of

causes. Was that pre-Court political position which

appeared to characterize Professor Felix Frankfurter
contradicted by his behavior on the bench,
opinions

or were the

rendered by this enigmatic Supreme Court Justice

^ Leonard Boudin, Book Review, 89 Harv. L .Rev.282 (1975)
(reviewing J. Lash, Fran The Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. 1975), P.
284-285
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part of an ideological metamorphosis he underwent as he
reflected on the appropriate position of the Supreme Court
over a lifetime as both student and teacher of law?
In his dissent in Baker v C a r r , Frankfurter's obvious
concern that the Supreme Court had just suffered a "self
inflicted wound" comparable only to Dred Scott,
his awareness of the potential

indicated

danger of its misuse of

power:
...Such a massive repudiation of the experience of
our whole past in asserting destructively novel
judicial power demands a detailed analysis of the
role of this court in our constitutional scheme.
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective
exercise of the Court's "Judicial Power" not only
presages the futility of judicial intervention in
the essentially political conflict of forces by
which the relation between population and
representation has time out of mind been and now
is determined.
It may well impair the C o u r t ’s position as the
ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land' in
that vast range of legal problems, often strongly
entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court
must pronounce.
The Court's authority--possessed of neither the
purse nor the sword--ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete
detachment, and by abstention from injecting
itself into the clash of political forces in
political settlements.

It is therefore to the most memorable of his decisions
that we must turn,

attempting to hopefully better come to

terms with the jurisprudence of Felix Frankfurter.

6'
6369 U.S. at 267.

Both he
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and his mentor Oliver Wendell Holmes,
remained faithful

Jr. appear to have

to a specific point of view as it relates

to the responsibilities of a Supreme Court

justice.

Perhaps in acknowledging what for both men was a
necessary dichotomy between his political
the responsibilities of a Supreme Court

preferences and

judge we will

find

an answer to the contradictory nature of much of their
decision making.
Louis Jaffee,

at the time,

Buffalo Law School,
Felix Frankfurter.

Dean of the University of

spoke of "the judicial

universe" of

Holmes definitely was not a liberal,

neither was his disciple,

Frankfurter,

whose

and

judicial

philosophy was so consciously inspired by the elder judge.
Neither of these men could be relied upon to deliver a
judgement because it immediately implemented some accepted
tenet of the liberal

legislative program.

Justice Frankfurter was in this sense no more
conservative than he was

liberal.

It is the very essence of

his judicial philosophy that his role on the Court precluded
him from having a program predicated upon a political
of view.
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Whether in fact his performance as a justice

confirmed such a belief is arguable.

^ Louis L. Jaffe, "The Judicial {Adverse of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter," 62 Harvard Law Review (1949) P. 358
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CHAPTER 6
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:

FREE SPEECH,

CONSISTENCY OR CHANGE IN HIS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY?
Any attempt to understand the basic philosophy that
underlies the jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes must
include an examination of his free speech decisions.

Some of

his most eloquent and telling words may be found in those
opinions he rendered concerning this vital

issue.

It is also

here where a clearer picture of the motivations which
underscored his career on the Supreme Court may hopefully
emerge. Max Lerner has written that Holmes's opinions in the
civil

liberties cases gave occasion to some of his most

moving utterances.

In this area he was writing with love and

without the sense of inhibition he had felt when dealing
with technical

economic problems. Here,

relation of state power to individual

in dealing with the

intellectual

freedom,

Holmes concerned himself with a subject on which Plato,
Milton, Mill, Bagehot and others had given of their best
energies.

It was a subject which as it dealt with states

rights was the most difficult and the most challenging.
there was one job which he was best able to confront,
reason of preparation and his deepest nature,
issue of freedom of speech.
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by

it was the

If
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He brought to it on the one hand a solicitude for individual
expression and also a toughness of mind which saw the
survival

of the state as a condition that came of the

creativeness of individuals within it.® (*my italics)
Holmes rendered his first Supreme Court opinion dealing
with the issue of freedom of speech in the case of Patterson
en
V. C o l o r a d o . This case concerned an editor in Colorado who
had published articles and a cartoon allegedly "reflecting
on the motives and conduct of the (judges of) the Supreme
Court of Colorado in cases still pending."^7 The editor in
question was convicted of contempt,

and appealed his

conviction on the basis that "to fine or imprison an accused
person in contempt proceedings for publishing the truth
about a judge or a court when the truth of the charge is
pleaded in justification... is to deprive him of liberty and
property without due process of law."7-7
Choosing to disregard the defendant's allusion to the
Due Process Clause, which he had assumed incorporated the
First Amendment to the Constitution,

the basis for Holmes's

decision was that the First Amendment merely codified the
law of criminal

libel.

He argued that,

"the main purpose of

^ Supra Note 6, P. 289
69205 U.S. 454 (1907)
70 Id at 459.
77 Id. at 456. Patterson had not stipulated that he was appealing
an the basis of the First Amendment, assuming that it was incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
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such constitutional provisions is to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced
by other governments,

and they did not prevent the

subsequent punishment of such as deemed contrary to the
public welfare."
Patterson claimed a right to comment about public
trials and the judges who decided them,

also that the

statements about the corrupt and partisan motives of
Colorado judges were true,
truth.

7?

and offered to prove their

But the Justice was not concerned with the truth or

falsity of Patterson's claims.

His opinion in this case

related directly to Blackstonian Common Law,
argued,

"the preliminary freedom extends as well to the

false as to the true;
as well
criminal
all.

7?

in which he

the subsequent punishment may extend

to the true as to the false." This was the law of
libel apart from statute in most cases,

if not in

The essence of Holmes's position was -that the state of

Colorado had the right to decide that it was not in the
public welfare for persons to make statements about the
conduct or motives of judges,

and it could if it so chose,

treat these statements as criminal

11Id. at 461.
73Id. at 462.

libels.
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According to G. Edward White,

the combination of the

'prior restraints'

limitation on First Amendment claims and

the

'bad tendency'

test announced as an evaluative standard

for

'police p o w e r 'limitations on free speech made Holmes'

Patterson opinion a very restrictive one. Under its
reasoning a state could suppress even true speech if it
concluded that the words had a tendency to promote socially
injurious acts.
Eight years after Patterson Holmes again advanced a
restrictive theory of freedom of speech in a Supreme Court
case,

once more sanctioning the use of

'bad tendencies'

justification for subsequent punishment of speech.
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as a

The "bad

tendency test" of which White speaks is that barometer which
judges had used to analyze free speech issues.

It derived

from the English common law of libel as synthesized by
Blackstone before the American Revolution.

The test

determined to measure the legality of speech by its tendency
to cause an illegal

a c t i o n . The case referred to here is

that of Fox v W a s h i n g t o n .^
The petitioner in Fox was an editor of a magazine in
which an article had appeared that discussed the
infiltration into a nudist group of "a few prudes," who
"proceeded in the b r u t a l , unneighborly way of the outside

G.Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:Law and the Inner
Self, (New York:Oxford University Press, 1993) P.351
75236 U.S. 273 (1915)
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world to suppress the people's freedom," and ultimately had
four members of the group arrested for indecent exposure.^
The article in question called for a boycott of the "prudes"
businesses,

saying that "the boycott will be pushed until

these invaders will

come to see the brutal mistake of their

action and so inform the people.

77

The editor of the article had been prosecuted under a
state statute,

and on appeal

to the Supreme Court of the

United States,

it was held that the article was "not a

criticism of the law, but was calculated to, and did, incite
the violation of the law."

In addition,

it noted that the

right of free speech did not mean "that persons may with
70
impunity advocate disregard of law."
Holmes's opinion stated that,

"we understand the state

court by implication at least to have read the statute as
confined to encouraging an actual breach of l a w ." and it
does not appear and is not

likely that the statute will be

construed to prevent publications merely because they tend
to produce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute or
of law in general."

(*my italics)He further argued that "the

disrespect for law that was encouraged was disregard of it-an overt breach and technically criminal

11 Id. at 276-77
73 Id.
79 Id. at 277.

act."
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And beyond

61

this,

that "by indirection but unmistakably,

the article

encouraged and incited a persistence in what we must assume
would be a breach of the state laws against indecent
exposure.
There is no doubt that in both Fox and P a t t e r s o n ,
Holmes had taken a stance consistent with his reliance on
the validity of English Common Law jurisprudence. He had
begun his free speech decision making by underlining the
basic power of state legislatures to suppress speech if in
fact such speech had a tendency to encourage or incite the
commission of a crime. His opinion in S c h e n c k . which was
delivered some four years later, bore, with its statement of
the "clear and present danger" test,
to the philosophical

a distinct similarity

position he had taken in these two

earlier free speech decisions.

Although the circumstances of

the decision were different, Holmes chose once again to rely
on both the issues of inciting disregard of the law,

as well

as those "bad tendencies" to which he had alluded earlier.
01
The decision in Schenck v. United States
was rendered
in the context of anti World War

I sentiment,

and although

the issue of free speech was once more at issue,

the

aftershock of Holmes's opinion would reverberate on into the
the 20th century.

Schenck and Baer had been indicted on

three counts of violating the Espionage Act of 1917:

81249 U.S. 47 (1919)
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conspiracy to cause insubordination in the military and to
obstruct the recruitment and enlistment;

conspiracy to use

the mails in violation of the Espionage Act;

and the offense

of using the mails unlawfully.
The evidence that was presented included minutes of a
meeting of the executive committee of the Socialist Party in
which a plan had been authorized that Schenck,
secretary,
draft.

the

prepare and publish a circular that condemned the

In addition,

there was testimony that Schenck did

order the publication of the circulars.

Also entered into

evidence was a pile of the circulars that had been found at
the party headquarters,

as well as newspaper clippings of

names of men who had already received their draft notices;
the Post Office's discovery of a number of the circulars in
the mail posted to men whose names had appeared on the list,
and the testimony of several men who had notified the postal
authorities that they had received circulars.
convicted the defendants on all counts,
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The jury

and the judge

sentenced them to ten years on each count,

though the

sentences were to be served concurrently.
After his conviction,
Supreme Court,

Schenck appealed to the U.S.

questioning the constitutionality of the

Espionage Act on First Amendment grounds.
appeal,

In the Schenck

the Court ruled unanimously to uphold the act in

question,

and Justice Holmes chose to say "a few words"

^ See Record at 17-62 Schenck.
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about it. The words of his opinion must surely help to
better explicate his position in the case:
But it is said, suppose that that was the tendency
of this circular, it is protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Two of the
strongest expressions are said to be quoted
respectively from well known public men.
It well may be that the prohibition of laws
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to
previous restraints, although to prevent them may
have been the main purpose. We admit that in many
places and in ordinary times the defendants, in
saying all that was said in the circular, would
have been within their constitutional rights. But
the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done.
The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater, and causing a panic. It does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering
words that may have all the effect of force. The
question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has the
right to p r e v e n t ... The Statute of 1917, in 4,
punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as
actual obstruction. If the act (speaking, or
circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent
with which it is done, are the same, we perceive
no ground for saying that success alone warrants
making the act a crime...
(*my italics)
Certain issues surrounding the rationale for Holmes's
opinion have been raised.

H.L.

Pohlman has argued that

according to Holmes's theory of liability,

if persons had

conspired to do something u n l a w f u l , that sufficed for a
conviction.

No proximity of harm was required.

84

33 Id at 52.
3^ G. Eduard White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Free Speech and
the Living Constitution (New York: New York University Press, 1991) P.
66
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David Rabban has responded that the language of clear
and present danger should be ignored. We would better look
at a sentence that appears

later in Holmes's opinion in the

case. Rabban argues that after Holmes had commented that the
existence of war was relevant to the question of Schenck's
liability,

in the next sentence he had recurred to the
AC
tendency doctrine'.

'bad

Pohlman's response to Rabban's position is that
Holmes's opinion that Schenck was guilty didn't necessarily
make him an adherent of the bad tendency doctrine. He says
that an act,

its

tendency and the intent

done are

in fact the same for Holmes.

they are

illegal or harmful,

could be

imposed even if the harm

Holmes said,

with which it is

In other words,

then in his

if

view liability

did not occur. All

that

in Pohlman's view, was that conspiring with

others was an act whose tendency and accompanying intent
were harmful.

Accordingly,

liability could be imposed on

persons who conspired to obstruct the draft through speech.

ae

Holmes treated conspiracy differently when speech was
the primary means that the conspirators used to reach their
objective.

Perhaps the justice thought that liability could

be imposed only if the group's purpose was unlawful

and only

if the planned speech activity had a reasonable chance of

flc
David Rabban, "The Emergence of M o d e m First Amendment Doctrine"
50 University of Chicago Law Review (1983), P. 1261.

86Ibid P. 68.
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causing harm, and liability was appropriate in this case
simply because the defendant's speech had been effective
enough to make the group illegal.
In The Common L a w , at Page 35, in Holmes's discussion
of early forms of liability may well be found a
foreshadowing of the rationale he had used here:
On the other hand, in substance the growth of the
law s legislative. And this in a deeper sense than
that what the courts declare to have always been
the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its
grounds. The very considerations which judges most
rarely mention, and always with an apology, are
the secret root from which the law draws all the
juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations
of what is expedient for the community con c e r n e d .
Every important principle which is developed by
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of
more or less definitely understood views of public
policy; most generally, to be sure, under our
practice and traditions, the unconscious result of
instinctive preferences and inarticulate
convictions, but none the less traceable to views
of public policy in the last analysis.
(*my
it a l i c s )

Holmes had chosen the terms "new reasons more fitted to
the times" in the same context,

and had clearly articulated

those "instinctive preferences and traditions" which so
influenced his own legal

thought.

In the case of Debs v United States

og
, in a unanimous

opinion Holmes wrote for the Court, White will

argue that

here was still another opportunity to apply his "attempts"

87 Ibid., P. 69.
88Supra Note 34, Page 35.
892 49 U.S. 211 (1919)
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analogy.

This had been the "cause celebre" of the Espionage

Act cases.

It was the case in which Eugene Debs,

the

Socialist Party candidate for President in 1912 was
convicted of obstructing the war effort on the basis of a
speech he made at the Socialists'
particulars of Debs'

convention.

Several

speech had been made the basis of a

criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.
alluded in this speech,

Debs had

according to the evidence presented,

to a visit that he had made to three

'loyal comrades'

were serving time in the workhouse for

'aiding and abetting

another in failing to register for the draft'.
Holmes'

approach to criminal

Deb's acts.

who

The logic of

attempts applied easily to

Holmes had maintained that the acts in question

raised the possibility that the purpose of the speech,
whether incidental

or not did not matter.

It was meant to

oppose not only war in general but this war,

and that

opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended
M

effect would be to obstruct recruiting.
Holmes's words stipulated that the jury was warranted
in its conviction,

and in his

judgment:

...finding that one purpose of speech, whether
incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose
not only war in general, but this war, and that
the opposition was so expressed that its natural
and intended effect would be to obstruct
recruiting. If that was intended, and if, in all
the circumstances, that would be its probable
effect, it would not be protected by reason of its

^ Supra Note 74, P. 420.
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being part of a general program and expression of
a general and conscientious belief.
It does, nonetheless,

seem appropriate that we consider

here a letter which Holmes sent to Harold Laski on March 16,
1919. Refering here to D e b s . Holmes wrote:
Dear Laski,
...I sent you yesterday some opinions in the
(Eugene) Debs and other similar cases (including
Sche n k ) . I greatly regretted having to write them-and (between ourselves) that the government
pressed them to a hearing. Of course I know that
donkeys and knaves would represent us as
concurring in the condemnation of Debs because he
was a dangerous agitator. Of course, too, so far
as that is concerned, he might split his guts
without my interfering with him or sanctioning
interference. But on the only questions before us
I could not doubt about the law.
The federal judges seem to me (again between
ourselves) to have got hysterical about the war. I
should think the President when he gets through
with his present amusements might do some
pardoning. I have been interrupted and so perhaps
have been less coherent than I should have been.

The period in which this letter was written undoubtedly
was far from n o r m a l . The issues with which the Supreme Court
had to deal must be considered,

according to Holmes,

in

"light of the circumstances."
It is worth noting that there is a strong similarity in
the circumstances which surrounded the decisions Oliver
Wendell Holmes would render during the time of the First
World War and comparable choices Felix Frankfurter would

91StS>ra Note 89, 211, 214-214
9^As quoted in Hie Essential Holmes, ed. Richard
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) P. 316.

Posner,
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make in another period of American history.

It is yet to be

determined whether the basic philosophy upon which
Frankfurter predicated such choices was very different from
that which had motivated Holmes more than twenty years
earlier.
Although both Schenck and Debs are more often discussed
in this particular vein,
States
cases.
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the case of Frohwerk v Uni ted

was in actuality the second in line of the espionage

It is significant because it stands as part of what

it is believed by many to be an important period of
transition in the free speech philosophy of Holmes.
F r o h w e r k . like S c h e n c k , involved an alleged conspiracy,
actual

danger of harm was required here,

no

and Holmes

apparently did not refer back to the "clear and present
danger" doctrine in his decision.
The defendant's conviction on conspiracy and eleven
counts of attempts to cause insubordination,

and refusal of

duty elicited the following response from Holmes:
...conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be
criminal even if no means were agreed upon
specifically by which to accomplish the intent. It
is enough if the parties agreed to set to work for
that common p u r p o s e ... the Court had to take the
case on the record as it is, and on the record it
is impossible to say that it might not have been
found that the circulation of the paper was in
quarters where a little breath would be enough to
kindle a flame and that the fact was known and
relied upon by those who sent the paper out.

93249 U.S. 204 (1919)
94 Id at 204, 209
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In all of the espionage cases, Holmes refused to
protect conspiracies to obstruct recruiting or to cause
insubordination in the military.
whether the unlawful

The issue here was not

goals were to be obtained by speech or

if there was no clear immediate danger of harm.
instance conspiracy spoke for itself,

In this

and in Lecture II of

The Common L a w , Holmes took a most telling position as it
related to the context of this discussion:
...probably most English-speaking lawyers would
accept the preventive theory without hesitation.
As to the violation of equal rights which is
charged, it may be replied that the dogma of
equality makes an equation between individuals
only, not between an individual and the community.
No society has ever admitted that it could not
sacrifice individual welfare to its own
existence ... because no civilized government
sacrifices the citizens more than it can help, but
still sacrificing his will and his welfare to that
of the r e s t ... public policy sacrifices the
individual to the general g o o d ...when we are
dealing with that part of the law which aims more
directly than any other at establishing standards
of conduct, we should expect there more than
elsewhere to find that the tests of liability are
external, and independent of the degree of evil in
the particular person's motives or intentions...
(*my italics)
It is around the question of whether public policy can
sacrifice the rights of the individual

to the general good

that Alexander Meikeljohn has built an argument which is
very critical
doctrine."

of Holmes and his "clear and present danger

Meikeljohn underlines the highly threatening

character of Holmes's phrase.

He points to the dominating

influence it has had on our understanding of self

^ Supra Note 34, P. 43,44,49,51

government. 1

Even opening the discussion of free speech to

the question of whether it does or does not have the
potential

for harm has in fact "led to the annulment of the

First Amendment rather than its interpretation."^7
One must ask, as does Professor Meiklejohn,
the line,

the principle,

"What is

which marks off those speech

activities which are liable to legislative abridgment from
those which,

under the Constitution,

the legislature is
net

forbidden to regulate or to suppress?"

For him,

there is no

rational manner in which we can allow suppression of speech
on one ground and allow it on another.

The very act of

pointing to specific instances where free speech is
unallowable is in fact erroneous,

"the distinction between

speech-actions and speech-thoughts is not,

then,

the

distinction which we need for the proper interpretation of
the First Ame n d m e n t .

Holmes had drawn a line around

speech-acts and asked us to accept that there may be acts of
speech which are not protected by the First Amendment,

acts

which can be abridged by virtue of the threat of harm which
they represent.

But the primary purpose of the First

Amendment was to guarantee that voters must vote freely,
judges and Congress as well.

In none of these instances

^Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self
Government. (New York:Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948) P.34

and
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could freedom of speech be abridged. Holmes's use of the
fire-shouting illustration spoke to a criminal

action which

was not protected by our conception of free speech.

But what

Holmes succeeded in doing was to make questionable that
specific area of speech which might be covered by the rubric
"clear and present danger." In Meiklejohn's view,

so long as

a man's "active" words are those he speaks as a participant
in public discussion and the decision of public policy,

his

words must be free from abridgment. What the "clear and
present danger" doctrine accomplished was to present a
threat which in its potentiality was far greater than the
alleged harm of the behavior it prohibited.

The very act of

opening up the question of whether freedom of speech could
be subject to the judgment of a specific group is what in
actuality represented the potential danger.

He points to the

change in Holmes's thought in the latter days of the year
1919,

and of his eventual

recognition that the doctrine of

"clear and present danger" was unsatisfactory.
the test remains on the books.

It is, "a working d e v i c e . " ^

Holmes's ambivalent phrase which,
initiator,

Nonetheless,

although rejected by its

continues to constitute an exception to the

freedom of speech.

100Id at P. 53.

It stands on the record of the Court as a
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peculiarly inept and unsuccessful

attempt to formulate an

exception to the principle of freedom of s p e e c h . ^
With reference to the change in perspective to which
Meiklejohn alludes,

David S. Bogen has made some interesting

comments concerning the question of whether there was in
fact any evidence of a real metamorphosis in Holmes's view
of free speech.

He argues that the seeds of what was to

become the "clear and present danger" test had been
developed early in Holmes's

life,

and adds that the

justice's skepticism and his unwillingness to depart from
prevailing legal doctrine had joined in preventing these
seeds from coming to fruition until he was in his seventies.
Abrams provides the example of such a "metamorphosis." The
sacredness of any existing ideas had never appealed to the
skeptical Holmes. He goes on to cite a letter from Holmes to
Pollack written in April

of 1910,

in which Holmes indicated

his skepticism as to our knowledge about the goodness or
badness of laws. Holmes had said that there was no way to
make such a definitive judgment outside of doing "what the
crowd wants.
Looking at these points of view,

one cannot help but

recognize that an attempt to understand Holmes must be more
than an examination of his isolated decisions.

Are we being

10lId. at P. 50.
102" 2j,e Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes", David S.
Bogen, Hofstra Law Review. Volume II, No.l, Fall 1982.
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entirely fair in judging an individual's choices in
microcosm? We may be wrong in condemning Holmes for what at
the time seemed the appropriate choice.
I doubt that Meiklejohn's criticism was meant ad
h o m i n e m . His is rather another perspective on the
contradictory nature of the opinions which color the
variegated fabric of Holmes's career in the law, and the
effect that they had on American jurisprudence.

Holmes's

heritage must necessarily include the fallout from his
"clear and present danger" test, but it is recognizable from
reading the story of his

life that he had always been an

ardent patriot. A philosophy such as his does not seem
inappropriate in light of his past.
Justice Holmes had fought in the Civil War,
giving his life on several

occasions.

almost

He had seen the result

of the undecided issue of state's rights,

and his response

was unquestionably reflected in many of the decisions he
rendered. He recognized that freedom of speech might be
potentially threatening in certain circumstances.

It could

also offer the possibility for positive change. This
dichotomy apparently vied for Holmes's support. He
undoubtedly accepted the concept of free speech in the
abstract,

but there was also that component

of his

philosophy which maintained that government must take those
steps necessary to protect its ultimate survival,
related to this freedom.

even as it

The Civil War had been a period in

which men needed to confront such questions.
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If Lincoln had sensed the necessity for doing away with
habeas corpus when the future of the nation was at stake,
perhaps Holmes saw a comparable rationale on the issue of
freedom of speech in yet another highly volatile time. One
must wonder whether Holmes had chosen to balance these
contending free speech perspectives,

selecting what in the

circumstances seemed a more "pragmatic" solution to a
comparable dilemma.
In the view of many,

Holmes's point of view concerning

freedom of speech softened prior to his opinion in Abrams.
He moved away from the "clear and present danger" doctrine
and examined each case on its own merit.

It has been

suggested that such change may have been the result of
pressures exerted by individuals he greatly respected,
well as,

and perhaps more importantly,

in light of that

characteristic quality which pervaded the judicial
Holmes.

The skeptic,

as

the eternal scholar,

life of

the justice so

often accused of contradictory position taking was not a man
who shrank from the possibility for change--not in his own
point of view or in the law. He had said,
education in the obvious--to learn,

"We too need

to transcend our own

convictions and to leave room for much that we hold dear to
be done away with short of revolution by the orderly change
of l a w . " ^

Was it in fact such "orderly change" which is

reflected in his decent in Abrams?

^ Supra Note 9
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Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down the
decision in D e b s . Judge Learned Hand wrote to Holmes that,
"Opinions are at best provincial

hypotheses,

t e s t e d . ..they are never absolutes.

incompletely

So we must be tolerant of

opposite opinions or varying opinions by the very fact of
the incredulity of our own." Hand had proposed a standard of
"direct incitement" which was unusually protective of free
speech,
unlawful

and had argued that only "direct advocacy" of
acts could be punished;

how critical

of governmental

all other speech,

policies,

no matter

would be p r o t e c t e d . ^

Further correspondence between Holmes and Hand late in
March of 1919 carried with it Hand's argument that speech
only violated the Espionage Act,
directly an incitement."
Debs'

"when the words were

It was clear that in his view,

intent was not at issue here. He believed that Debs

would have been guilty only if he had actually incited his
listeners to violate the law. Holmes's response on April

3

indicated that he saw no basic difference in their
t h i n k i n g .^

A n d , in a letter written by Holmes to Herbert

Croly on May 12 of the same year,
actuality sent to Croly,

a letter which he never in

but rather to Harold Laski, Holmes

commented on an article by Ernest Freund in The New
R e p u b l i c . The .article was titled "The Debs Case and Freedom

noted in Gerald Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins of
M o d e m First Amendment Doctrine: Seme Fragments of History. " Stanford
Law Review. XXVII (1975) P. 720.
105Id.
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of Speech," and in it, Freund had criticized Holmes's
decision in D e b s , citing the arbitrariness of the whole idea
of implied p r o v o c a t i o n .

The copy of this letter appears in

the highly telling correspondence Holmes shared with Laski,
and based on Holmes's comment that this was "poor stuff,"
one may recognize the effect such criticism was having on
his psyche.
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The months that followed his decision in Schenck served
to elicit what for some was a changed viewpoint from the
judge.

It is conceivable that an article that appeared in

the Harvard Law Review of June,
Zechariah Chafee,

and written by

had given Holmes pause.

Chafee had argued that,
cause direct and

1919,

In the article,

"unless it is clearly

liable to

dangerous interference with the conduct

the war...the line should

be drawn,

of

close to the point where

words will give rise to unlawful acts." Chafee had also
provided additional questions concerning the rationale
Holmes had used in S c h e n c k . Frohwerk and D e b s .
Further,

100

in

a letter

written in October of 1919,

interestingly at

the time

in which the Court would hear

argument in the case of A b r a m s , one may find that,

although

'^Ernest Freund, "The Debs Case and Freedcm of Speech," The New
Republic, XIX, May 3, 1919, P. 13.
^ Holmes-Laski Letters (cited earlier) Supra Note 14, P. 203.
Zechariah Chafee, "Freedcm Of Speech In Wartime, " Harvard Law
Review. XXXII (June 1919) P. 932-73.
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Holmes had chosen not to acknowledge the aforementioned
criticism,

it is arguable that it had affected him.

Regarding his readings,

so well documented in the

correspondence with Laski and Sir Frederick Pollack, Holmes
had apparently spent considerable time during this period
studying political philosophy,

biography and history.

There

can also be little doubt that the opinions of others were in
fact on his mind.
In the words of a letter Holmes sent to Laski on
October 26,

1919,

one must conclude that,

although he has

been credited with a real metamorphosis in philosophy,
Holmes continued to show allegiance to that Common Law
philosophy upon which he had earlier relied.

He wrote:

I fear we have less freedom of speech here than
they have in England. Little as I believe in it as
a theory I hope I would die for it and I go as far
as anyone whom I regard as competent to form an
opinion, in favor of it. Of course when I say I
don't believe in it as a theory I don't mean that
I do believe in the opposite as a theory. But on
their premises it seems to me logical in the
Catholic Church to kill heretics and the Puritans
to whip Quakers--and I see nothing more wrong in
it from our ultimate standards than I do in
killing Germans when we are at war. When you are
thoroughly convinced that you are right-wholeheartedly desire an end--and have no doubt of
your power to accomplish it--I see nothing but
municipal regulations to interfere with your using
your power to accomplish it.
The sacredness of human life is a formula that is
good only inside a system of 1aw--and so of the
rest--all of which apart from its banality I fear
seems cold talk if you have been made to feel
popular displeasure. I should not be cold about
that--nor do I in any way shrink from saying what
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I think--but I can't spare the energy necessary to
deal with extra legal themes... * (*my italics)
The correspondence Holmes shared with Sir Frederick
Pollack also overflowed with comment on the reading Holmes
found time to do in this very volatile period in his
judicial

life.

In April

of 1919 he had written to Pollack

that he planned first to read Harold Laski's new book,
Authority in the Modern S t a t e , a book dedicated by the
author to both Holmes and Felix Frankfurter.

He also

mentioned that he was getting "stupid letters of protest
against a decision that Debs,

a noted agitator,

was rightly

convicted of obstructing the recruiting service so far as
the law was c o n cerned... There was a lot of jaw about free
speech,

which I dealt with somewhat summarily in an earlier

case-Schenck v U . S .--also Frohwerk v. U . S . ...As it happens
should go further probably than the majority in favor of
i t ... " ^ These are certainly contradictory words from a man
who has been alleged to have taken a real turn in his
philosophy on the issue of free speech,

a change of mind

that would in fact determine his dissent in A b r a m s .
For some,

the change had been from a more conservative

philosophy of the law based in Blackstonian Common Law
jurisprudence,

to the more open minded stance.

But for

^ Holmes-Laski Letters, P. 217-218.
^ Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice
Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932.. Ed. Mark Deffolfe Howe,
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1941, 1961) Addenda, P.7.
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others,

this is only further corroboration of the philosophy

he

had followed

todate. Here again one is confronted with

an

enigma. What in fact had been Holmes's rationale for

the

dissent in the Abrams case?
In Felix Frankfurter's estimate of Justice Holmes,

we

find another contribution to the debate as to whether Holmes
had actually changed his point of view on free speech:
Just as he would allow experiments in economics
which he himself viewed with doubt and distrust,
so he would protect speech that offended his taste
and wisdom. At bottom both attitudes came from a
central faith and a governing skepticism. Since
the whole of the truth had not yet been, and is
not likely to be...The first duty of an educated
man was to doubt his major premise even while he
continued to act on it. This was the skeptical
conviction with which he distrusted dogma, whether
economic or intellectual. He had a positive faith-faith in the gradual power to pierce nature's
mysteries through man's indomitable endeavors.
This was the road by which he reached an attitude
of widest tolerance towards views which were
strange and uncongenial to him, lest by a
premature stifling even of crude or groping ideas
society might be deprived of eventual wisdom for
attaining a gracious civilization.
In his dissent in A b r a m s . had Holmes in fact,

"doubted

that major premise" which he had followed prior to it? If
the premise had centered around his views concerning the
ultimate primacy of government and its objectified law,

can

we look at Abrams as anything more than a reinforcement of
that position?

Fran Mr. Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court, (previously
cited at Note 59), P. 85.

On November 19,

1919, Holmes and Brandeis would cast

the two dissenting votes in the case of Abrams v United
States.

IIP

In August of 1918,

Jacob Abrams,

a Russian

immigrant and an anarchist had been arrested in New York,
along with several

of his associates.

The charges had been

that they conspired to publish and distribute

(1) language

about the form of government of the United States that was
"disloyal,

scurrilous and abusive."

(2) "language intended

to bring the form of government of the United States into
contempt"

(3)language "intended to incite,

provoke,

and

encourage resistance to the United States in its war with
Germany,

a n d . ..(4)language that advocated "curtailment of

production of things and products,

to wit,

ordinance and

ammunition necessary and essential to the prosecution of the
w a r ."113
The government's evidence included two circulars,
written in English and the other in Yiddish,

one

and the

printing and distribution of these circulars in circles
where there was some chance of causing opposition to the
American government's policy of intervention in Russia and
harm to the war effort in Germany.

The issue underlined by

the prosecution had been that of "intent," and the
defendants had argued that their criticism had.only been of
policies that President Wilson's administration had pursued

lU250 U.S. 616 (1919)
113Id at 617.
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regarding Russia.

They maintained that they had not

encouraged resistance to the United States or to the war
effort against Germany.
Judge Clayton,

in his directions to the jury, had

indicated a clear dichotomy between motive and intention,
motive is that which leads a person to do a certain act.
intention is a design,

or a plan,

The

or purpose to use a

particular means to effect a certain r e s u l t .
Clayton,

"A

According to

the jury could convict the accused even if the

purpose of his acts had not been to hinder the war effort or
to provoke resistance.

The appeal to the United States

Supreme Court was predicated upon this very issue. The
defense argued that there had been no evidence presented
that the defendants had violated the Espionage Act.
evidence was enough for a conviction,

If the

then the Espionage Act

was unconstitutional.
All that the defendants had done,
defense,

according to the

was to engage in a public discussion of a public

policy that dealt with a nation with which our country was
not at w a r . They maintained that the Constitution gave
absolute protection to those whose intent was only to
criticize existing policy of government officials. Holmes's
dissent,

if it was based upon his theory of legal

appears to have offered him little choice.

Recorded at P. 237-238 of Abrams.

It was

liability,
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unconstitutional

to punish a person for conspiracy without

evidence of unlawful

purposes. He argued that no one could

believe that "the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man; without more,

would present any

immediate d a n g e r ."^s (*my italics) And added that publishing
"these opinions for the very purpose of obstruction...might
indicate greater danger,

and at any rate would have the

quality of an a t t e m p t . " ^ Such an intent could not be found,
and was therefore not a basis for imposing liability on the
defendants.

These defendants had not,

D e b s . attempted to obstruct the draft.
obtain an unlawful

as was the case in
They had not tried to

result, nor had they represented a threat

of harm to the status quo. The following words from Holmes's
opinion in A b r a m s , serve well to explicate both the
philosophy he held concerning the case in question,

and more

importantly, may lead us to a better understanding of that
philosophy of law and the Constitution which defined his
jurisprudence:
That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is
an experiment. Every year if not every day we have
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is
part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the

115Id. at 616, 629.
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c o u n t r y ... Only the emergency that makes it
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of
evil counsels to time warrants making any
exception to the sweeping command, Congress shall
make no l a w ... abridging the freedom of speech.
It is clear that, although Holmes has been considered a
liberal by many,

the 1950s and 60s saw a growth of

commentary which was highly critical

of the argument that

Abrams represented a distinct change in Holmes's free speech
position.

Samuel Konefsky has argued that Holmes had no real

ideas of his own,

only unreflective prejudices--"clear and

present danger" accordingly was just a casual
rationalization to uphold criminal

remark,

convictions,

a

that did not

become one for protecting freedom of speech until

Justice

Jff

I

Brandeis

lent his "powerful

support."

Sheldon Novick has also pointed to Yosal Rogat's
criticism of Holmes,

in which,

according to Novick,

Rogat

has traced the doctrine of Schenck to the external standard
of The Common L a w .119

Novick goes on to take the position

that anyone who suggests that Holmes's point of view
concerning freedom of speech did in fact change is clearly

117Id at 630-631.
11fl
Samuel Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis. (Macmillan:
1956), as cited in Sheldon Novick, "The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of
Expression," First Amendment Law Handbook 1993-94 Edition, (Deerfield,
111.'.Clark Boardman Callaghan:1993) Page 201.
Sheldon Novick, "The Unrevised Holmes and Freedcm of
Expression", in First Amendment Handbook 1993-1994 Edition, (Deerfield,
111.: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993) P. 206, 207.
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incorrect.

R o g a t 's essay,

"Mr.

Justice Holmes: A Dissenting

Opinion," written for the Stanford Law Review in 1984,
for the most part,
argument.

is,

a very strong and well documented

In the preface to the article,

there is a

reference back to a prior statement made by the author:
Holmes's opinions are among the tersest and most
elliptical n the history of the Supreme Court.
This contributes to their rhetorical power, but it
also makes them particularly difficult to
construe, and open to diverse interpretation.
This article,

published by James M. O ’Fallon,

permission of Rogat's children,
the work Rogat began in 1962.

had been the second half of

Rogat once again attacked

Holmes's account of legal phenomena.
critique,

with the

According to Rogat's

it was "basically impoverished." In his view,

Holmes suffered from a failure to distinguish a crude system
of social

control which rested upon naked force from a

distinctively legal method of control.

For Holmes,

"a legal

system was simply a mechanism to enforce the desires of the
Ml

dominant group."

Justice Holmes's objective approach to

the law saw it as simply an attempt to reduce law to an
external standard. What follows in Rogat's work is a telling
citation from one of Holmes's earliest opinions:

Yosal Rogat, "Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion," 15
Stanford Law Review 3, (1962-63) P. 254
1l
Yosal Rogat and James O ’Fallan, "Mr. Justice: A Dissenting
Opinion— The Speech Cases," Stanford Law Review. Vol. 36, July 1984. P.
1361,62
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As the aim of law is not to punish sins, but is to
prevent certain external results, the act done
must come pretty near accomplishing the result
before the law will notice it.
In conclusion,
should be "neutral,
political

Rogat argues that for Holmes,

judges

friction free transmission belts, making

rights exactly equivalent to societal power.

Novick's essay also speaks to Holmes's views relating
to the question of social

policy.

Holmes had argued that the

privilege accorded to free speech was a justification for
self restraint on that privilege.
Holmes's perspective,
the individual

Self restraint could from

only be based on the self interest of

citizen.

As far as government was concerned,

by virtue of its own self interest,

it ought not allow

experiments with ideas and laws designed and intended to
destroy it.

"Clear and present danger" for Holmes,

Sheldon Novick reads it,

is just "one of many shorthand

expressions for this central
individual

idea,

the point at which

liberty was set aside by the importance of

governmental

interest.

what judges decided,
peaceful

as

174

In essence,

for Holmes,

law was

and the rule of law meant a system of

debate to which all

individuals were admitted so

322Commonweal th v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18,20,48 N.E. 770 (1897), as
cited in Rogat P. 1365.
123Id. P. 1368

124Id. at 417-419.
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long as they followed the rules, no matter how dangerous
Uc
were the ideas.
What this examination has produced thus far appears to
coincide with many of the views expressed by both White and
Novick.

There is, however,

a point made by White that may be

open to discussion. White has suggested that there is no
question but that Holmes's

later free speech decisions

reflect his expanded consciousness of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments,
position,

and that he diverged from his earlier

recognizing these amendments as significant in and

of themselves and not as simply codification or analogies of
the Common Law. He has also commented that toward the
conclusion of Holmes's legal

career,

the Justice seemed more

concerned with making clear his increased awareness of the
implications of free speech than with maintaining doctrinal
iir

co n s i s t e n c y .
If one examines the litany of his free speech opinions,
Holmes's first priority appeared to remain consistent with
the words he had written in his examination of The Common
Law.

Public policy must sacrifice the rights of the

individual

to the general

good.

127

Recognizably,

willing to see Abrams on its own merits,

^ Supra Note 84., P. 437.
1

As found in The Caiman Law, Op cit 95.

he had been

but one might
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comfortably argue that this case was not evidence that
Holmes had changed at all. His dissent in A b r a m s . can only
be understood as centered upon the "attempts" rationale he
had used earlier.

There had been no "attempt" to subvert the

ends of government in Holmes's view.

That would seem to have

been enough to satisfy his standards.
Holmes was undoubtedly the skeptic that Felix
Frankfurter had described.

It was surely the ability of

Oliver Wendell Holmes to recognize the implicit differences
in the cases he was to decide--to view them,
words,

in his own

"in the light of different circumstances," that

clearly marks his decisions.

This does not,

however, make a

convincing argument that his basic belief in the character
of the law had seen a metamorphosis,

or that he had come to

see the position of a judge as more than the restatement in
a particular generation of the "present" point of v i e w . ^
The first free speech dissent following Abrams was in
United States ex r e l , Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing
Co. v Burl s e n .

. The issues in this case dealt with whether

the Postmaster General

of Milwaukee had discretionary

authority to exclude publications from the mails based on a
guess as to their future content.

The Postmaster General

128
path of The Law," Oliver Wendell Holmes. Harvard Law
Review. Vol X, No. 8, March, 1897. P. 458.
129255 U.S. 407, 436 (1920)

had
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in fact denied second-class mailing privileges to the
newspaper,

the Milwaukee L e a d e r , on the grounds that it had

printed articles critical

of the war effort,

and thus under

the rules of the Espionage Act of 1917, such newspapers had
been "non-mailable." Although the Act had not indicated that
future issues of a "non-mailable" publication could be
barred,

the Postmaster General

had taken the position that

in the light of past violations the newspaper had forfeited
its second class mailing privileges,

and therefore the

government could refuse to renew t h e m . ^ The majority of the
Court held that the articles had clearly violated the
Espionage Act and that in the light of this,

the Postmaster

could presume from this that future publications would do so
as well.

Holmes,

confessing that until he had read

Brandeis's dissent he had been inclined to adopt the
majority position,

indicated that he was now convinced that,

"the Postmaster General

could not determine non-mai1a b i 1ity

in advance." The only thing he could do under the statute
was to deny second-class mail privileges and after the
publications were mailed,

refrain from forwarding the

p a p e r s ... and return them to the senders."

He was not in

Holmes's view empowered to decide on the basis of a
publication's content,

130Id. at 412.

whether it could not be carried in
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the m a i l s . ^ Holmes argued that the Postmaster General had
lacked authority to deny access to the mails in future.
There had been no explicit statutory language which conveyed
him such power.

In his opinion,

"the use of the mails is

almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues,

and it would take very strong language to convince

me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically
I9*
despotic power to any man."
Denial of second-class mailing
privileges for the future,
serious attack on
In a similar
Postmaster (1921),

in the Justice's view was a

our liberties.
case the next year,

Leach v C a r l i 1e

the Post Office refused to transmit

advertising literature for "Organo Tablets" on the grounds
of fraudulent representation of medicine, Holmes and
Brandeis again refused to join in the majority opinion.
Holmes's opinion stated that:
I do not suppose that any one would say that the
freedom of written speech is less protected by the
First Amendment than the freedom of the spoken
word. Therefore I can not understand by what
authority Congress undertakes to authorize anyone
to determine in advance, on the grounds before us,
that certain words shall not be uttered. Even
those who interpret the Amendment must strictly
agree that it was intended to prevent previous
res t r a i n t .

131 Id.
132 Id.
Ul258 U.S. 138, 140 (1921)
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If one attempts

to appropriately understand the

significance of H o l m e s ’s words here,

it seems clear that

there was a distinct and necessary separation between what
the law would allow and the abstract rights of individual
ci ti z e n s .
It was in Git low v. New York and United States v.
Schwimmer where some argue that Holmes's reputation as a
civil

libertarian was greatly advanced.

An examination of

each of these cases will nevertheless show that his
decisions were based on an underlying philosophy of law that
in fact permeated his free speech opinions.
Under New York law, Gitlow had been found guilty of
advocating criminal

anarchy.

Abrams decision.

It was 1925,

longer a central

issue.

Six years had passed since the
and the First World War was no

The conviction of Gitlow had been

based upon the publication of a pamphlet called "The Left
Wing Manifesto," in which he had written of proletarian
dictatorship,

political

strikes and similar issues.

concluded his pamphlet with the words,
International

He had

"The Communist

calls the proletariat of the world to a final

struggle." He had been charged with only the circulation of
this pamphlet.

No questions had been raised as to overt acts

directed toward the overthrow of the government.

The issues

in the case involved nothing more than whether political
agitation by words was constitutionally protected.

The
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Court's decision was that they were not. Holmes's dissent in
this case initially argued that since this was an alleged
infringement of free speech by a state rather than by the
federal government,

free speech was not specifically

protected from state encroachment in the Constitution.
The First Amendment related only to actions of the
federal

government,

and thus,

the "due process" clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable here. He then
went on to define what in his judgment were the allowable
areas of free speech:
If what I think the correct test is applied, it is
manifest that there as no present danger of an
attempt to overthrow the government by force on
the part of the admittedly small minority who
shared the defendant's views. It is said that this
manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an
incitement. Every idea is an incit e m e n t ... The only
difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may
set fire to reason...
If the publication of this document had been laid
as an attempt to induce an uprising against
government at once and not at some indefinite time
in the future it would have presented a different
question. The object would have been one with
which the law might d e a l , subject to the doubt
whether there was any danger that the publication
could produce any result...But the indictment
alleges the publication and nothing more. * (*my
italics)
Justice Sanford,

speaking for the Court indicated that

the reasonable exercise of the state's police power was
constitutional.

134Id.

Harmful

speech acts were within the power of
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the state,

and the advocacy of anarchy was sufficiently

dangerous to be considered a harmful speech a c t . ^ It is
interesting that the Court,

without Holmes's support,

had

used a somewhat changed version of his "clear and present
danger" test,

and that Holmes had cited his own version of

"clear and present danger" but with an important disclaimer.
The Justice's choice not to defer to a legislative
finding that advocating criminal

anarchy was harmful

state appears some how contradictory. However,

to the

he himself as

early as 1897, had said that the law's purpose was to punish
harmful

a c t s , not sinners.

criminal

Perhaps a person who advocated

anarchy in a situation where no harm could occur

might be an evil person,
Nonetheless,

but he had done nothing harmful.

one must wonder whether Holmes's decision might

have been a different one if the charge had been conspiracy.
H.L.

Pohlman argues that Holmes had indicated by his

position in Gitlow the necessary balance that had to be
maintained between individual
authority.

rights and legislative

He has attempted to tie together the motivating

factors recognizable in Holmes's decision.

He understood

speech activity according to three categories of his theory
of legal

liability:

privileges.

Harmful

135Id. at 671.

harmful

acts,

attempts,

and abuses of

acts were treated especially harshly.
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If a rational

and prudent person,

knowing what the agent

knew in the circumstances of an act, would judge the
speaker's act to be harmful

in itself,

the speaker was

liable no matter the intent or foresight.

Libel and contempt

of court were examples of such harmful acts, while Gitlow's
advocacy of anarchy was not.
It is remarkable,

though,

that at eighty four, in

December of 1925, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to his friend
L a s k i , "The Chief called me up by telephone to know if a
case that he proposed to assign to me would be too
troublesome...I told him that if he spared me in that way I
ought to leave. He gave me the case and I polished it off in
short m e t r e . . . This letter to Laski is full of talk of
the intellectual
supplied.

pleasure his cases for the year had

He had even added a word about his efforts at

writing them shortly and compactly with a hint at general
theory when it was possible.

This had provided "good sport"

for a rather remarkable man who by most standards should
have been ready to retire.
Although for many, Holmes's opinion in Gitlow marked a
turning point in the adjudicative processes of our nation,
White has underlined the ambiguities in Holmes's approach in

'^H.L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. (New York: New
York University Press, 1991) P. 87
':lHemes-Laski Letters. P. 806.
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the case. He goes so far as to say that even if Gitlow did
not present a libertarian trend in Holmes's view of speech,
there is evidence that he did feel a sense of commitment in
this area,

and he argues that in the last years of the

Justice's career,

his positions on the issue would be

irreconcilable with his Espionage Act opinions.

In addition,

White believes:
The dizzying contradictory implications of these
several sentences suggest the risk inherent in
assuming that Holmes' striking phrases express a
developed ideology. Holmes the judge was often
consumed by the sheer attraction of language
itself. Phrases like "every idea is an excitement"
and "the only meaning of free speech" exemplified
his style. Although arresting and memorable, they
often collapse as analytical guidelines.
In the final analysis,

Holmes's Gitlow dissent was more

an example of his distinctive literary style than an attempt
to develop a new First Amendment

jurisprudence.

Holmes could

not have been expected to be governed by the unqualified
language he used, because he himself believed that all
questions were questions of degree.

legal

In the free speech cases

that followed Git l o w , cases in which Holmes

joined with

Brandeis in the years between 1925 and the end of his tenure
on the Court,

he showed what was in White's view,

a clear

jig

commitment to free speech.

^

White, Supra Note 84, P. 444

*^<7. Edward White, "Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free
Speech Jurisprudence:The Human Dimension." In First amendment Law
Handbook. (Deerfield, 111.:Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993) P. 487
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As understood by both White and Novick,

the opinion

which best exemplifies Holmes's consciousness toward free
speech is that which he rendered in United States v
Schwimmer

The case dealt with a forty-nine year old woman

of Hungarian citizenship who had applied for American
citizenship.
pacifist,

The woman,

who in 1915,

Hungary,

Rosika Schwimmer,
while she was still

was a prominent
living in

had persuaded Henry Ford to send a peace ship to

Europe to, in her words,

"bring the boys out of the trenches

by C h r i s t m a s . " ^
After coming to the United States in 1921 for a visit
and lecture tour, she had settled in Illinois.

In November

of 1921 Schwimmer had declared her intention to become an
American citizen,
naturalization.
process,

and in 1926 had filed a petition for

When asked,

as part of the naturalization

whether she was "willing to take up arms in defense

of her country," her answer had been in the negative.
filing a petition for citizenship,

Upon

her request was denied on

the grounds that she was "unable...to take the prescribed
oath of allegiance," and was therefore,

"not attached to the

principles of the Constitution of the United States" nor
"well disposed to the good order and happiness of the

140279 U.S. 644 (1929)
141Id.
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s a m e . " ^ She was, however,
Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit which reversed the original

finding,
April

granted a hearing by the Court of

and the case was heard by the Supreme Court in

of 1929.
Holmes's dissenting opinion,

Brandeis,

in which he was joined by

is unquestionably one of his most respected.

His

reference back to Schenck makes a rather large portion of
the decision worthy of examination here:
Of course the fear is that if war came the
applicant would exert activities such as were
dealt with in Schenck v United S t a t e s . But that
seems to me unfounded. Her position and motives
are wholly different from those of Schenck. She is
an optimist and states in strong and, I do not
doubt, sincere words her belief that war will
disappear and that the impending destiny of
mankind is to unite in peaceful leagues. I do not
share that optimism nor do I think that a
philosophic view of the world would regard war as
absurd.
But most people who have know it regard it with
horror, as a last resort, and ...would welcome any
practicable combination that would increase the
power on the side of peace...Some of her answers
might excite popular prejudice, but if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other
it is the principle of free thought-- not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate. I think that we
should adhere to that principle with regard to
admission into, as well as to life within this
country.

142Id. at 646
143 Id.
144 Id. at 653-54
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Both Novick and White argue that this case represented
a total abandonment of the "clear and present danger" test.
However,

although Meiklejohn would undoubtedly disagree,

it

has for many become a viable means for protecting those with
divergent points of view.

If the only limit put on freedom

of speech is the question of whether certain statements
represent the imminent danger of harm to the nation,

then

any speech that stands outside of this requisite addendum is
in fact not subject to prohibition.

Although I would

maintain that the impetus for Holmes's original

choice of

these words was his desire to conserve the power of the
state,

they are for many an indication of a strongly

libertarian point of view.

It may also explain why so much

confusion exists concerning Holmes's liberal/conservative
status.
In White's view,

at the time when Holmes was to emerge

as one of the founders of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence,

the locus of philosophical

energy animating

solicitude for free speech had shifted from the individual
as an autonomous being to the individual
democratic society.

as participant in a

According to this new school

of thought,

the sources of protection for speech were not identified
with the interest of the individual whose liberty government
existed to further,

but rather with the social

interest in
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furthering democratic principles by encouraging independent
public discussion and d e b a t e . ^ He goes on to say that:
The process by which Holmes participated in the
transformation of free speech jurisprudence was in
the end an idiosyncratic process, despite its
larger doctrinal implications. By treating Holmes'
free speech cases as if they were the formulations
of an orthodox judicial-opinion writer, some
scholars have been misled into emphasizing
doctrinal continuity or contradiction, when Holmes
was not particularly interested, except on a
surface level, in those dimensions of his
opinions. Others have been overly anxious to
identify Holmes as the founder of a modern
libertarian tradition of First Amendment
analysis ...
But, White argues,
Amendment

early twentieth century First

jurisprudence did not mirror the evolution in

Holmes's thought. Holmes was logically inconsistent in his
free speech decisions.

Looking for some logical progression

in Holmes's free speech jurisprudence can only lead to
frustration.

There is no rational way to square his views

with either a positivist view or with conventional
of judicial deference to the will

of the majority.

theories
147

Turning back to "The Path of the Law," one finds some
clear indicators of the legal philosophy that in actuality
colored Holmes's free speech decisions.

This essay,

seen as

the backdrop for the positions Holmes would take as a

145White, P. 450
146White, P. 453
147Id. at 496-97
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Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,

presents

the clearest picture of where he stood at the time he wrote
it, and where he would continue to stand as an adjudicator.
In light of what Holmes had said in 1897,

to argue that

there was no logical progression in his decision making does
not necessarily have to serve aa a condemnation. When Holmes
argued that,

"The reports of a given jurisdiction in the

course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body of
the law,

and restates it from the present point of v i e w , " ^

there can be no doubt that for him,
phenomenon.

law was an ever-changing

The law was,"the prophecies of what the courts

will do in fact,

and nothing more p r e t e n t i o u s . " ^

Holmes was the skeptic here,

the realist who understood

that in each given instance where a judge was asked to make
a decision,

the possibility existed that he might choose a

different course,

see in a different set of circumstances a

reason to change his mind.

This was perhaps the judge we

find in G i t l o w . Nonetheless,

he was also the ardent advocate

of principles established in the Common Law.

Recounting the

issues in a case heard some three hundred years earlier,
talked of the "now" in which he found himself,

a now where

malevolent motives could not be seen in a moral sense,
morals were irrelevant.

The issue for him was undoubtedly

148St«>ra Note 128, P. 458.
at 461

he
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the motivation for his decisions in A b r a m s , Debs and
S c h e n c k . These were cases in which the question of liability
prevailed for Holmes:
But nowadays no one doubts that a man may be
liable, without any malevolent motive at all, for
false statements manifestly calculated to inflict
temporal damage. In stating the case in pleading,
we still could call the defendant's conduct
malicious; but, in my opinion, at least, the word
means nothing about motives, or even about the
defendant's attitude toward the future, but only
signifies that the tendency of his conduct under
the known circumstances was very plainly to cause
the plaintiff temporary harm.
There is no definitive rightness or wrongness that the
judge may turn to. For Holmes,
an illusion.

It was that

certainty was generally only

judgment as to the relative worth

and importance of competing legislative grounds,
inarticulate and unconscious
of every legal proceeding.

often an

judgment that was at the heart

The law was the preference of a

given body at a given time and place. We didn't adequately
realize that a large part of the law was open to
reconsideration predicated upon only a small
public m i n d . ^ Here was Holmes the relativist,

change in the
and probably

the judge we see in G i t 1o w . But his were also the words of
the Legal Realist we find in Schwimmer:

150Id. at 463.
151Id. at 466
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I think that they themselves have failed
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing
considerations of social advantage. The duty is
inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed
judicial aversion to deal with such considerations
is simply to leave the very ground and foundation
of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious
judges 152
Yes, we have found many aspects of Holmes in his free
speech decisions,

but we are being unfair if we are too fast

in condemning him for his contradictory stances. He said in
1897,

and his actions in the years to come would vindicate

his belief that,
philosophical

"We are only at the beginning of a

reaction,

and of a reconsideration of the

worth of doctrines which,

for the most part still are taken

for granted without any deliberate,

conscious and systematic

questioning of their g r o u n d s . " ^
How prescient was this statement.

One must wonder what

he would have said had he known the full

impact of his

"clear and present danger" test. He might well have
attributed its ramifications to anything but the original
significance of the words.

It is interesting to consider the

possibility that had he lived, Holmes would have understood,
as he did in 1897,
decided.

152Id. at 467
153Id. at 468.

that the law continued to be what judges
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Although many would quote his words with reverence,

and

others criticize him for a lack in continuity, Holmes might
have undoubtedly chuckled at the significance that had been
made of his contribution. He was never an ideologue,
surely not a predictable entity.
of government is undeniable,

and

His belief in this system

as was his confidence that

humanity's search for answers would continue long after he
was gone.

Perhaps Oliver Wendell Holmes cannot entirely

satisfy the demands of the libertarians,

but neither can he

speak for the advocates of totalitarianism.
This

judge of the Progressive era didn't always satisfy

the progressives.
conservatism.

He was also not always the voice of

Holmes was the product of a generation which

had begun to question itself,
by its past,

a generation still influenced

but also recognizing on many levels that it

couldn't march securely forward without recognizing that
change was endemic to the human condition.
profound,

and his acolytes profuse.

of many who followed,
mentor's footsteps.

His influence was

Felix Frankfurter,

one

would often attempt to walk in his

The question remains as to how Holmes's

philosophy effected this younger man,

a man who would also

make his mark on American jurisprudence.

CHAPTER 7
FELIX FRANKFURTER:

FREE SPEECH,

FOLLOWER OR INNOVATOR--A QUESTION OF DEGREE
The literature is replete with commentary on the
judicial

career of Felix Frankfurter,

and as one examines

the positions he took in the area of civil

liberties,

emerges a picture that is often contradictory.

there

Such

seemingly inconsistent behavior it might well be argued,
does not relate entirely to some philosophical
heart,

because his insistence upon judicial

change of

restraint

remained consistent.
Undoubtedly,

Frankfurter appeared to have come a

distance from Gobitis to S w e e z y , but one must question
whether what seemed an apparent metamorphosis did not in
fact serve to reify his basic jurisprudence. What we do find
in the litany of Frankfurter's opinions is a clear
contradiction of his pre-court,

more liberal political

stance.
In reviewing his opinions as a member of the Supreme
Court,

what may be discoverable is the explication of what

Felix Frankfurter considered the appropriate position the
judiciary must take in American government.

This is a

position which he appeard to have diligently attempted to
maintain,

and which by its very nature produced a rather

contradictory pattern.
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Some would argue that Frankf u r t e r ’s tenure on the Court
lacked a commitment to civil

liberties and civil

rights, not

living up to the expectations engendered by his pre-Court
c a r e e r .^

Others would defend him,

arguing that his

reputation has suffered in this area not because he was
paralyzed,

but because of the lesson of judicial humility he

had learned,

and which constantly tempered his judgments.2^

How like words we have heard said of Holmes are these:
Frankfurter brought a unique historical
perspective to each problem, seeking always to
ensure that the changing currents of contemporary
judicial conviction did not overwhelm the steady
trend toward responsible democracy ....

W ill i a m T.Coleman,
Frankfurter,
of absolutes,
articulated,

Jr. suggests that for Justice

constitutional

litigation was not the provence

but only of relative values which were to be
weighed and compared,

and Arthur E. Sutherland

has chosen to include a quotation from Holmes in examining
the jurisprudence of Frankfurter:
...In substance the growth of the law is
1 egislative. . .The very considerations which judges
most rarely mention, and always with an apology,

334Leonard Boudin, Book Review, 89 Harvard Law Review 282 (1975)
(reviewing J. Lash, Fran the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter (1975))
333 "Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian As Lawyer And
As Justice: Extent to which Judicial Responsibilities Affected His PreCourt Convictions." William T. Coleman, Jr., in Six Justices an
Civil Rights, ed. Ranald D. Rotunda, (New York: Oceanic Publications,
Inc., 1983) P.88

156Id.
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are the secret roots from which the law draws all
the juices of life. I mean, of course,
considerations of what is expedient for the
community con c e r n e d .157
Sutherland argues that it is precisely Frankfurter's
sensitivity to all sides of a question that have made
certain of his critics
turncoat,

judge him as an intellectual

and such criticism is certainly understandable.

Frankfurter had come to the Supreme Court as what many
considered a liberal

firebrand,

and those decisions he would

render had undoubtedly been a disappointment in the view of
certain of his detractors.

It is interesting to note that

Sutherland also comments that Frankfurter distrusted, much
as did Holmes before him,

any idea that a verbal

could make decisions for him,
necessity of hard judicial

formula

and thus eliminate the

choices.^

Alexander Bickel provides some interesting insight as
well.

For him, Frankfurter had deferred in two senses as a

judge. He had deferred judgment to the greater precedence of
political

institutions,

deferred judgment.
the judiciary.

and in some instances had simply

Certain issues were not the province of

For Frankfurter,

representative bodies.

courts were not

This was the essence of the words he

^ "All Sides of the Question", Arthur E. Sutherland, in Felix
Frankfurter: The Judge, ed. Wallace Mendel son, (New York:Reynal 6
Carpany, 1964) P. 110.

158Id. P. 148
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had written in his concurrence in Dennis v United S t a t e s .
Here was an instance in which Frankfurter chose to defer to
the legislature,

thus concluding that the anti-Communist

Smith Act did not violate the First A m e n d m e n t . ^
Frankfurter,
democratic,

although thoroughly progressive and

was also appropriately skeptical. He had

apparently listened to Holmes's advice before and after
Holmes gave it to him.

Justice Frankfurter had never fallen

prey to the vulgar cynicism that affected his fellow
realists.

Constitutional

constitutional

law was to be applied politics and

adjudication was the job of a s t a t e s m a n . ^

Not long after he came to the Court in 1939,
Frankfurter would, by those positions he took,

Felix

indicate that

he had undoubtedly brought with him a sense of public
responsibility tempered with a belief that the judiciary
must remain as apolitical

as possible.

One might question

whether his decision in the Gobitis case was anything but
political,

however it is reasonable to conclude that in this

instance Frankfurter's position was predicated upon his
strong sense of public responsibility.

It was time and place

that appear to have been his major considerations in this

^Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress,
(New York: Harper S Row, Publishers, 1970) P. 30
160 Id., P. 23
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decision,

and in many ways this would parallel

future

choices he would make as a judge.
In the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis
(1940), Frankfurter,

in his opinion for the Court,

expressed

what he considered his necessary deference to maintaining
judicial

restraint even in face of what for some represented

an open restriction on civil
Gobitis,

age twelve,

l i b e r t i e s . ^ In 1936, Lillian

and her brother Will i a m had come home

to inform their parents that they could no longer attend
school because they had refused to salute the national

flag.

The reason why the children had refused to salute the flag
was that as Jehovah's Witnesses,
violation of their religion.

to salute the flag was a

The children's father filed

suit on their behalf and his own,

asking to be relieved of

the financial burden of educating them elsewhere. He also
sued to prevent the Board of Education from continuing to
require the flag salute as a condition for the children's
attendance at the Minersville school.
The case was heard in federal

district

court in

Philadelphia and the family was granted "relief" by the
judge. The Minersville Board of Education appealed to the
U.S.
1940.

Circuit Court of Appeals,

and was denied.

In a period not unlike that which

Holmes's opinions in S c h e n c k , Froehwerk

m 310 U.S. 586 (1940)

The year was

set the stage for
and D e b s , and world
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war was once again at hand.
the circumstances,

The Supreme Court,

in light of

chose to listen to argument in the case.

Patriotism was in the air as the threat of war confronted
American public opinion.
A committee set up by the American Bar Association
argued that:
The compulsory flag salute cannot be sustained on
the ground that public school education is granted
as a matter of grace so that the requirement, even
though arbitrary and capricious, can be enforced
by expulsion from public school...We believe that
the letter and spirit of our Constitution demand
vindication of the individual liberties which are
abridged by the challenged regulation.
The writing of the majority opinion was assigned to
Justice Frankfurter,
before.

who had come to the Court only a year

And after recalling "many talks with Holmes about

his espionage opinions," which he regarded as providing
guidelines for the flag-salute case, Frankfurter explained
that his opinion would be:
a vehicle for preaching the true democratic faith
of not relying on the Court for the impossible
task of assuring a vigorous, mature selfprotecting and tolerant d e m o c r a c y ... This was the
responsibility of the people and their
r e presentatives.
...the flag salute is an allowable portion of a
school program for those who do not invoke
conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.
But for us to insist that, though the ceremony may
be required, exceptional immunity must be given to
162 Id.

163Id.
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dissidents, is to maintain that there is no basis
for a legislative judgment that such an exemption
might introduce elements of discipline, might cast
doubts in the minds of other children which would
themselves weaken the effect of the exercise.
In a letter Frankfurter wrote to Justice Stone,

who was

the sole dissenter in G o b i t i s , one may find a better
understanding of those primary motivations for Frankfurter's
opinion in the case. He wrote:
But no one has more clearly in his mind than you,
that even when it comes to these ultimate civil
liberties, insofar as they are protected by the
Constitution, we are not in the domain of
a b s o l u t e s ...We are not exercising an independent
judgment; we are sitting in judgment upon the
judgment of the legislature... ”
According to Mark Silverstein,

Frankfurter never

considered the judiciary the primary protector of civil
liberties.

Such a position would have,

perspective,

from Frankfurter's

severely restricted the Court's flexibility.

Justice Frankfurter emerges here as both a civil
as well as a firm believer in judicial

restraint.

Court was to be responsible for protecting civil

libertarian
If the
liberties,

it would loose the ability to weigh and balance critical
elements of judicial statesmanship.

The judge's view of

statesmanship and the judiciary called for judicial

164

Id.

^Frankfurter to Justice Harlan Fiske Stcme, 5/27/40 (As cited in
Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca:Cornell University
Press, 1984) P. 145
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enforcement of principles that would aid a progressive
society in the accomplishment of its common goals. ^
Frankfurter,

echoing Holmes, believed that the place of

the judiciary in American government included its necessary
reinforcement of federalism,

and thus that the states might

serve as "laboratories" for social change.

In his view,

Supreme Court, during the twentieth century,

the

had used the

due process clause to restrict the police power of the
states,

and in so doing inhibited their function as the

place for such innovation.

In his book, The Public and Its

G o v e r n m e n t , we may find Frankfurter's ideal
republic,

"In simple truth,

for our

the difficulties that government

encounters from law do not inhere in the Constitution.

They

are due to the judges that interpret it..." Here again, not
unlike his predecessors Marshall

and Holmes,

Frankfurter

recognized the danger implicit in putting too much power in
the Court.

In so doing he also acknowledged that,

constitutional

adjudication was an exercise in statecraft

and that the Constitution was,

"not a text for

interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a
167

progressive people."-"’'

m ld. at P. 148
^ Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government, (New
Haven:Yale University Press, 1930), P. 79-80, P. 76

Ill
In G o b i t i s , Frankfurter had taken the side of the
legislative judgment that the symbolic importance of the
flag salute served as part of the foundations for social
unity. His words spoke to this belief:
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the
binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such sentiment
is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and
spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions
of a people, transmit them from generation to
generation, and thereby create that continuity of
a treasured life which constitutes a civilization.
We live by symbols. °
Three years later,

in West Virginia State Board of

Education v B a r n e t t e . the Court reversed itself and held
that participation in patriotic exercises could not be
demanded of the Jehovah's Witnesses.

Frankfurter's dissent,

although he might well have argued to the contrary,

was

undoubtedly motivated by his strong sense of patriotism.
can hardly understand it as a non-political

choice:

One who belongs to the most vilified and
persecuted minority in history is not likely to be
insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our
Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude
relevant, I should wholeheartedly associate myself
with the general libertarian views in the Court's
opinion, representing as they do the thought and
action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither
Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic...
As a member of the Court I am not justified in
writing my private notion of policy into the
Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish
them or how mischievous I may deem their
d i s r e g a r d ... The constitutional protection of
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did

^®Si5>ra. Note 161 (Minersville School District v Gobitis)
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not create p r i v i 1e g e s ...Law is concerned with
external behavior and not with the inner life of
m a n ...
As a result of the Gobitis decree,

several

children of

the Jehovah's Witnesses had been expelled from the West
Virginia schools,
reformatories.

and were threatened with incarceration in

A group of the parents of these children

challenged the law and its regulations,
an invasion of individual

rights.

claiming that it was

Suing in the federal

district court in Charleston, Walter Barnette,

Paul Stull

and Lucy McClure asked for an injunction to stop enforcement
of the compulsory ruling against Jehovah's Witnesses.
The state board of education asserting its authority,
cited G o b i t i s . and asked that the complaint be dismissed.
special

bench was designated to hear the case,

A

and Judge

Parker and his colleagues chose not to follow the Gobitis
precedent.

The West Virginia Board of Education appealed the

decision directly to the Supreme Court,

as the law provided

it might do, and the case was heard on March 11,
On June 14, 1943,

in a 6 to 3 vote,

1943.

the Supreme Court

handed down a decision in West Virginia Board of Education
v. B a r n e t t . reversing the Gobitis decision.
votes were by Justices Roberts and Reed,

The dissenting

who chose not to

join in the dissenting opinion as written by Frankfurter.

^ Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624
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They merely noted that they adhered to the views as had been
expressed in G o b i t i s . Justice Frankfurter remained faithful
to the premise which had influenced his earlier decision.
"One may have the right to practice one's religion and at
the same time owe the duty of formal obedience to laws that
run counter to one's b e l i e f s ,” 170 he wrote.
In Max Freedman's superb compilation of correspondence
between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Felix Frankfurter,

the

words that the author chooses to add after including a large
portion of Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette offer an
interesting sidelight to our examination of Frankfurter and
his life on the Court.

Freedman writes:

At the Hyde Park discussion of the Gobitis case,
of which Frankfurter made a record, Mrs. Roosevelt
said she would not presume to question
Frankfurter's legal scholarship and reasoning. But
there seemed to her to be something wrong with an
opinion, both in logic and in justice, that forced
little children to salute a flag when such a
ceremony was repugnant to their e x istence... The
President disagreed. He said with great emphasis
that what the local authorities were doing to the
children was 'stupid, unnecessary, and offensive'
but it fell within the proper limits of their
legal power. That was an exact statement of
Frankfurter's own position.
The case of Bridges v. California was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1941. Harry Bridges,

a West Coast

labor

leader, had been held in contempt of the California courts

170Id.
171

Roosevelt and Frankfurter, Their Correspondence 1928-1945. ed.
Max Freedman, (Boston: Little Broun and Ccnpany, 1967) P. 701
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for sending a telegram to the Secretary of Labor which he
subsequently had published in several newspapers.

In this

telegram he had warned that a strike would take place if the
state courts chose to enforce an "outrageous" decision in a
labor case. The state courts had found that the publication
of the telegram interfered with the orderly administration
of justice,

and on an appeal

to the U.S.

Supreme Court,

Bridges argued that the contempt citation had abridged his
constitutionally protected freedom of speech.7^
Bridges had originally been argued during the 1940
term,

and the vote had been 6-3 to affirm the conviction.

However,

in his original

draft opinion for the Court,

his subsequent dissenting opinion,

and in

Frankfurter reinforced

the same ideas. He argued that there was no doubt but that
freedom of expression was "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," but that what was of greater significance
was that the measure of any freedom was in the specific
nature of that freedom and the means by which it had been
c u r t a i l e d .^
Mark Si 1v e r s t e i n 's rendering of Frankfurter's rationale
here is that according to Frankfurter,

the task of the

377314 U.S. 252 (1941) (This case was consolidated with a similar
case which involved the Los Angeles Times. that had, in an editorial
urged that a state court hand out heavy sentences to two convicted
"labor goons. ”
173 Ibid.
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judiciary was to balance, measure,

and mediate.

expression was not an absolute order.

Freedom of

It was a principle to

be laid out and predicated upon the circumstances of a
particular case.

To treat freedom of speech as an absolute

would prevent courts from controlling its impact on other,
equally important values.

He argues that throughout

Frankfurter's draft opinion as well as in his published
dissent,

there is a consistent message that there must be a

delicate balance between order and f r e e d o m . ^ F r a n k f u r t e r 's
dissenting 1941 opinion included these words:
By the Constitution of C a l i f o r n i a ... the citizens
of the state have chosen to place in its courts
the power, as we have defined it, to insure
impartial justice. If the citizens of California
have other desires, if they want to permit the
free play of modern publicity in connection with
pending litigation, it is within their easy power
to say so and have their way.'
It is interesting to note that Justice Black,
justice who was

the

later to become the absolutist as it

referred to First Amendment doctrine,

chose in his draft

dissent written during the 1940 hearing to use the "clear
and present danger test."

After commenting that the Court

did have the powers Frankfurter had alluded to in his
original

draft opinion,

Black wrote:

374Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca:Cornell
University Press, 1984) P. 180.

773Si£>ra Note 173
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Considering the values of the constitutional
liberties that are here abridged, I believe it
would be much better to say that state courts
should never punish for contempt in such cases
unless there was found to be a clear and present
danger of an immediate interference which could
not be averted without the imposition of
punishment.

Not unlike Holmes,

Frankfurter remained firm in his

belief that it was the responsibility of the judge to find
solutions that meshed with the "felt necessities of the
times." We may also see a foreshadowing of the position he
would take in his concurrence in Kovacs v C o o p e r (1949).
The Court's emphasis on the importance of First
Amendment rights had led to what has been called the
"preferred freedom" doctrine.

The phrase was first used by

Chief Justice Stone in his dissent in Jones v Opelika
(1941),

(in which the Court upheld local

those who sold goods;

licensing fees for

as applied to Johovah's Witnesses

selling their literature.)

In part,

the Chief Justice had

written:
The First Amendment is not confined to
safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of
religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe
them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by
virtue of the First and Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t s , has
put them in a preferred position.

111316 U.S. 584, 608 (1941)
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In Frankfurter's concurrence in Kovacs

(1949) he chose

to take issue with Justice Reed's majority opinion in its
reference to "the preferred position of freedom of speech."
His objections were that "it expresses a complicated process
of constitutional
that it is,
thought,

adjudication by a deceptive formula," and

"a mischievous phrase,

which it may subtly imply,

if it carries the
that any law touching

communication is infected with presumptive i n v a l i d i t y . " ^
Christopher Wolfe believes that Frankfurter's point was
that protection of speech must sometimes be balanced against
other values.

The legislature has the primary responsibility

for this. We must,

in other words,

approach the

constitutionality of a law as it applies to free speech in
the same manner as we would any other law.

179

Another wartime decision presented Felix Frankfurter
with the need that he balance a legislative judgment against
intervention by the Court.
mentor,

Not unlike the experience of his

Frankfurter found himself also facing the question

of whether the deprivation of individual

liberties are open

to re-consideration in specific circumstances.
his opinion in the Schneiderman case,
gathers that Frankfurter believed,

In light of

decided in 1943,

one

as did Holmes before him,

178336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949)
179
Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of M o d e m Judicial Review (Supra
Note 16, P. 250.
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that government security must under certain circumstances
take precedence,

even when it meant that the rights of

specific individuals were jeopardized.
a rationale,

Predicated upon such

the Justice Department had attempted to revoke

the citizenship of naturalized citizens of German and
Italian origin who had obtained citizenship illegally or
under false pretenses.

The case of Schneiderman v United

States7^, was decided by the Court in 1943. William
Schneiderman,

a Communist born in Russia in 1905, had come

to the United States in 1908,
citizenship.
groups.

and in 1927 had applied for

He had by that time joined several Communist

In 1932,

he ran for governor of Minnesota as the

Communist party candidate.

In 1939,

the government moved to

strip him of his American citizenship on the grounds of his
Communist activities in the five years preceding his
naturalization as an American citizen,

arguing that he had

not been truly attached to the principles of the U.S.
Constitution.

Schneiderman maintained that he did not

believe in using force or violence,
good citizen,

and that he had been a

had never been arrested and had used his

rights as a citizen to advocate change and greater social
justice.
The Schneiderman case came before the Court in 1942,
concurrent with the United States'

180320 U.S. 118 (1943)

entrance into the Second
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World War,
ally.

and its acknowledgment of the Soviet Union as an

Schneiderman was represented by Wendell Wilkie,

a man

who had run as the Republican candidate for president in
1940. Wilkie pleaded with the Court not to establish a legal
rule that a person could be punished for alleged adherence
to abstract principles.
on December 5, 1942,

At a pre-decision Court conference

Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone

presented a strong statement that the government should have
the power to rid the country of agitators who didn't believe
in the Constitution,

but worked actively to overthrow the

IS !

government.

Melvin Urofsky comments that, bearing in mind
Frankfurter's idolization of Holmes and Brandeis,

one might

have expected him to speak in defense of Schneiderman,

not

unlike the manner in which Holmes had defended Rosika
Schwimmer.

132

Frankfurter nonetheless supported Stone,

explained his reasons in great

length.

and

This case, he began,

"arouses in me feelings that could not be entertained by
anyone else around this table." He went on to talk about his
work in the U.S. Attorney's office in dealing with
naturalization cases and confessed that,
ties with formal

religion,

"as one who has no

perhaps the feelings that

787As cited in Melvin I. Urofsky, Judicial Restraint and
Individual Liberties (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991) P. 70.
182 Id. at P. 170.
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underlie religious forms for me run into intensification of
my feelings about American citizenship."
For Frankfurter,

"American citizenship implies entering

upon a fellowship which binds people together by devotion to
certain feelings and ideas and ideals summarized as a
requirement that they be attached to the principles of the
Constitution." While mere membership in the Communist party
did not constitute grounds for either denying or revoking
citizenship,

Frankfurter believed that Schneiderman's

actions had gone far beyond paying dues. He had made a
commitment to a "holy cause" and "no man can serve two
masters when two masters represent not only different,

but

JQ9

in this case, mutually exclusive ideas."
The Court handed down its decision,

and ruling for

Schneiderman the majority held that a naturalized person
couldn't be deprived of citizenship without the clearest
justification.
Roberts,

Justice Stone,

joined by Frankfurter and

dissented vigorously.7^

Felix Frankfurter,

a naturalized citizen himself,

clearly believed that he owed his total allegiance to the
United States.

Communists could not possibly share that

sense of identity to this nation.

In this instance,

freedom

^Summary of discussion at Conference, 5 December 1942, FF-HLS
(as cited in Melvin Urofsky, P. 70-71)
784Supra Note, at 175.
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of belief was not applicable.

In reaffirmation of that point

of view he had enunciated some three years earlier,
Frankfurter wrote:
...the relentless choice events may force on every
individual cannot be met by such a fair sounding,
pernicious abstraction as that 'war never settled
a n y t h i n g .185
Clearly,

Stone and Frankfurter had not been interested

in disproving the concept that war never settles anything.
They were,

however,

congressional

belief

interested in conveying the idea that
in the efficacy of an oath to defend

this country had its basis in human reason,
prevail

in this instance.

and that it must

The Court's action in overriding

the need for such an oath was,

in Frankfurter's view,

counter to the desires of the legislature,

and it might well

be argued that his choice to dissent in this case was based
on deference to legislative authority,
Judge's pervasive patriotism.

as well as the

Beyond this,

one can see

further evidence of his preference that policy be based on a
moderate "balancing" of interests.

In this instance,

he

apparently believed that the scales must be balanced in the
direction of congressional

supremacy.

The year 1948 brought still

another case to the Court

that dealt with the issues of congressional power over
immigration and naturalization.

This,

the case of Ludecke v

^ Felix Frankfurter, New York Times. June 19, 1941.
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Watkins

. concerned a German enemy alien, who,

after a

hearing held under the authority of the Attorney General,

a

hearing not required by any provision of the Alien Enemy
Act,

had been directed to be deported from the United States

based on the finding that he was dangerous to the public
peace and safety.
Ludecke's petition for habeas corpus had been denied by
the lower courts,

and it was in the opinion that Frankfurter

wrote for the Court that this petition was again denied.
Responding to argument that the petitioner was not
dangerous,
sense,

and that the war was over but not in a legal

Frankfurter took the position that the Attorney

General's decision had been warranted as part of the
executive's prerogative.

It was up to the executive and the

legislature to notify the Court of the war's end. The
President's choice to have a non-reviewable war power
exercised within narrower limits than were legislatively
permitted did not provide sufficient reason for judicial
intervention.

The concluding words of his dissent may help

to define Frankfurter's position here:
we hold that full responsibility for the just
exercise of this great power may validly be left
where the Congress has constitutionally placed it-on the President of the United States.

186335 U.S. 160 (1948)
187Id. at P. 173.
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Although this presidential power might be abused,
judicial

review was not called for until

some flagrant

violation had taken place.

Congress had the power to draw up

schemes of naturalization,

and the president was the primary

holder of war power.

Once again deferring to

constitutionally granted higher authority,

Frankfurter found

no reason for the intervention of the judiciary. His
tendency to defer to legislative judgment may well have been
based on a belief that only in those cases of extreme
overbearance by the representative body should the Court
move to interfere with its actions.

Such perceived occasions

would apparently bring a change in his

judicial stance,

and

the 1950s brought what might be construed as a softening in
his view on this issue. Whether in fact this was the case is
subject to inquiry.
Helen Shirley Thomas argues that the Justice strongly
enunciated antipathy toward a doctrinal
constitutional

approach to

law. This had resulted in a partial

repudiation of the "clear and present danger test" as it
10Q
dealt in the area of subversive activities.
She adds that
Frankfurter admitted that in certain instances legislative
judgment concerning the threat to society had been
exaggerated,

and this, unfettered individual

should not be tampered with. He did, however,

788Supra Note at 64.
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also accept
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what he considered the other equally important part of the
equation,

that when some reasonable argument could be made

for legislative fears that a direct and positive danger
threatened this country's self-preservation,

even the action

iog
of individuals must be curtailed. 07
Frankfurter's sense of the "clear and present danger"
doctrine was that its original

reason for existing had been

Holmes's interest in protecting public security.

Those

desirous of specifically protecting absolute freedom for
individuals or groups had distorted its meaning,
use it in areas where individual

choosing to

or group rights were at

stake.
In the case of Dennis v United States7^7. the Court
chose to use the words of Holmes and Brandeis,

finding its

own road toward an attempted understanding of what they
really meant.

It has been argued that the Court destroyed

the "clear and present danger test" and upheld the
punishment of alleged conspiracies to overthrow the
IQ]
government at some uncertain time in the future.
The meaning of judicial

restraint according to Felix

Frankfurter was that the decision of Congress must be

189Id at P. 212-213
190341 U.S. 494 (1951)
998S ee Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter. Supra Note. 42.,
P. 197
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accepted as final unless such action can be proven to be
without

reason. At issue in Dennis was whether the

provisions of the Smith Act that made it a crime to teach or
advocate the overthrow of this government,

or to help

organize or be a member of any group advocating or teaching
such overthrow were justiciable.

The United States in the

year 1948 found itself in a changed political
Soviet Union was no longer our ally,

climate.

The

and the Cold War had

begun.
The government had obtained indictments against twelve
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
alleging a conspiracy against the United States in violation
of the provisions of the Smith Act. The trial which lasted
more than six months was held in the Southern District of
New York before Judge Harold Medina.
defendants were found guilty,
affirmed on appeal

In a jury verdict,

the

and the convictions were

in a decision rendered for the Federal

Circuit Court by Judge Learned Hand. Hand's words presented
a restatement of the "clear and present danger test," In
each case

(courts) must ask whether the gravity of the evil,

discounted by its improbability,

justifies such invasion of

free speech as is necessary to avoid danger."
Hand's view,

199

In Justice

the weighing of the evil and the value of free

speech belonged to the legislature.

Because it was often

^ United States v Dennis 183 F.2nd 201 (2 Cir. 1950)
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impossible for legislatures to undertake such balancing in
specific situations,
the jury)

it was correct for the Court
jg*
to act in place of the legislature.

(and not

Frankfurter's opinion was filed as a concurrence with
the Supreme Court's decision.

His words are worthy of

important consideration here.

They present with great

clarity that point of view which he attempted to maintain:
Congress has determined that the danger created by
advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing
restriction on freedom of speech. The
determination was made after due deliberation, and
the seriousness of the congressional purpose is
attested by the volume of legislation passed to
effectuate the same ends.
Can we say that the judgment Congress exercised
was denied it by the Constitution? Can we
establish a constitutional doctrine which forbids
the elected representatives of the people to make
this choice? Can we hold that the First amendment
deprives Congress of what it deemed necessary for
the Government's protection? To make validity of
legislation depend on judicial reading of events
still in the womb of time--a forecast, that is, of
the outcome of forces at best appreciated only
with knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations-is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its
equipment.
Hugo Black,

the Justice with whom Frankfurter was often

to disagree as it concerned the issue of First Amendment
jurisprudence offered a much shorter
opinion in the case.

(only three page)

Stating that it served no useful

purpose that he present an extended discussion of his

794Supra Note 186, P. 550-551.
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disagreement with the Court's decision,

as it simply stemmed

from a fundamental difference in Constitutional

approach,

Black went on to say that:
So long as this Court exercises the power of
judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree
that the First Amendment permits us to sustain
laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on
the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere
'reasonableness.' Such a doctrine waters down the
First Amendment so that it amounts to little more
than an admonition to Congress.
In 1957,

Justice Frankfurter wrote opinions in Watkins

and in S w e e z v . In both cases he wrote in concurrence with
the Court's result.

In each of these decisions,

that a man, who in the issues under review,

he argued

had been judged

punishable for refusing to answer questions in an
investigation of Communist activities,

had been convicted

improper 1v .
Watkins v. United States was a prosecution under Title
2 United States Code Section 192 for the misdemeanor of
"contempt of Congress." This statute provided penalty for
refusal

to answer questions which were considered "pertinent

to the question under inquiry."

In refusing to answer

certain questions asked of him by the House Un-American
Activities Committee, Watkins had been convicted under the
statute by the lower federal

195341 U.S. 550-551

courts.

Frankfurter's words do
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more toward a better understanding of his

judicial

philosophy than that one might provide in paraphrasing them:
By...making the federal judiciary the affirmative
agency for enforcing the authority that underlies
the congressional power to punish for contempt,
Congress necessarily brings into play the specific
provisions of the Constitution relating to the
prosecution of offenses and those implied
restrictions under which the Courts f u n c t i o n ...To
turn to the immediate problem before us, the scope
of inquiry that a committee is authorized to
pursue must be defined with sufficiently
unambiguous clarity to safeguard a witness from
the hazards of vagueness in the enforcement of the
criminal process against which the Due Process
Clause protects ...While implied authority for the
questioning by the Committee, sweeping as was its
inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated
acquiescence by Congress of the Committee's
inquiries, the basis for determining the
petitioner's guilt is not thereby laid...The
circumstances of this case were wanting in these
essentials.
(*my italics)
It may well be argued that Frankfurter's opinion in
Watkins showed no real change in his view as to the role of
the judiciary.

It is also conceivable that it does not

indicate a more openminded reading of the First Amendment.
Freedom of speech was not at issue in his concurrence in the
Watkins case.

It is further elaboration of Frankfurter's

chosen stance that the Court must remain apolitical,
the view of some an evocation of his judicial

restraint.

Frankfurter's decision in the Watkins case underlined
constitutional

issues.

1915354 U.S. 178 (1957)

and in

It spoke specifically to that
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"constitutionally allowable" realm in which the Supreme
Court could intervene in the business of the legislature.
In his examination of the relationship shared by
Frankfurter and Black, Mark Silverstein states that
throughout the 1950's,

Frankfurter's ad hoc balancing took

the middle ground between the absolutism of Black and
Douglas and the apparent abnegation of Justices Clark and
Burton.

He argues that during the days of the McCarthy era,

Frankfurter and Harlan offered leadership as they disposed
of cases by using procedural

grounds or statutory

interpretation as their rationale.

Frankfurter stood in the

swing position on the Court. What the votes of Harlan and
Frankfurter served to accomplish proved critical

in

reversing the Court's direction and in sustaining the power
of Congress.
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The decision in Sweezv provides a somewhat

different picture of Justice Frankfurter.
igo
In Sweezv v. New H a m p s h i r e ,
the Attorney General
New Hampshire,
legislature,

of

operating under a resolution of the state

embarked upon an investigation to determine

whether the state subversive activities act was being
violated.

Sweezy,

a professor at the state university,

was

asked to testify. When asked about his past Communist
affiliations,

Sweezy denied ever having been a member of the

197Supra Note 173, P. 204-205
198354 U.S. 234 (1957)
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Communist party, but refused to respond when asked questions
that concerned the Progressive party. Additionally,

he

refused to respond when questioned about a lecture he had
given at the university.

He was found in contempt of court,

and the state court proceeded to confirm the conviction.

A

six-man majority of the Supreme Court reversed the state
court's decision,
issues.

but chose to avoid any first amendment

They held that the failure of the state legislature

to stipulate,

when granting authority to the Attorney

G e n e r a l , that it wished the type of information these
questions attempted to elicit,
violation of due process.
joined by Harlan,

was in their judgment a

Frankfurter's concurrence,

as

selected to center his opinion around

Sweezy's First Amendment

rights:

Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of
hypothesis and speculation. The more so is true in
the pursuit of understanding in the groping
endeavors of what are called the social sciences,
the concern of which is man and
s o c i e t y ...Whatever, on the basis of massive proof
and in the light of history of which this Court
may well take judicial notice, be the
justification for not regarding the Communist
Party as a conventional political party, no such
justification has been afforded in regard to the
Progressive Party...For society's good-^if
understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into these problems, speculations about
them, stimulation in others of reflection upon
them, must be left as unfettered as possible...

199 Jcf. at 261,

267
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There can be no doubt that academic freedom was of
particular significance for Felix Frankfurter.
teacher of law,
was integral

Both as a

and appropriate to his belief that education

to the development of a progressive society,

his decision in Sweezy does not indicate any dramatic change
in Frankfurter's personal

philosophy.

Here had been another

professor attempting to lead his students in the direction
of further understanding,
New Hampshire,

and in ruling against the state of

Justice Frankfurter ne Professor Frankfurter,

seemingly readjusted his over-riding belief in federalism,
balancing it against the importance of a "laboratory of
ideas".

Frankfurter had surely selected in this case to

suppress his belief in judicial
that in his view,

restraint.

It would appear

the social worth of what Professor Sweezy

had done in the classroom took precedence over some supposed
shortsightedness which the state had alleged. What is
questionable is whether Frankfurter's opinion was not in
fact "political," and if he had not permitted himself the
luxury of reinforcing Holmes's view that law was what

judges

decided it was.
The decision of the Court in B arenblatt v. United
States^

represented a departure from S w e e z y . which had

placed limits on the ability of congressional
inquire into political

2OO360 U.S. 109 (1959)

committees to

beliefs and associations.

Barenblatt,
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decided by a vote of 5 to 4, found Felix Frankfurter
standing with the majority.
Barenblatt,

The case concerned a Lloyd

a man who had previously served as a psychology

instructor at the University of Michigan and at Vassar
College.

Subpoenaed to testify before the House Un-American

Activities Committee,

Barenblatt had refused to answer

questions pertaining to his past or present membership in
the Communist Party and in other groups,

arguing that the

First Amendment prohibited an investigation of his political
beliefs and associations.
of Congress,

After being convicted of contempt

Barenblatt appealed his conviction to the

Supreme Court. Although Frankfurter wrote no opinion in this
case, he selected to join with the majority in denying the
plaintiff's request.
had often voted,

Justice Harlan,

with whom Frankfurter

wrote the opinion for the Court,

upholding

the Committee's authority against First Amendment claims of
freedom of expression and association,

concluding that:

...Undeniably, the First Amendment in some
circumstances protects an individual from being
compelled to disclose his associational
relationships. However, the projections of the
First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the
privilege against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment, do not afford a witness the right
to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where
First Amendment rights are asserted to bar
governmental interrogation, resolution of the
issue always involves a balancing by the courts of
the competing private and public i n t e r e s t s ... the
balance between the individual and governmental
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interests here at stake must be struck in favor of
the latter.

Helen Shirley Thomas's belief that the Court,
Justice Frankfurter,

including

felt that the questions asked were

germane to the subject under investigation,

and that the

relationship was made very clear to the witness,7^ remains
open to question.
Frankfurter had concurred in Watkins using as his
reasoning his concern for that "constitutionally allowable"
realm in which the Supreme Court could intervene in the
business of the legislature.

He obviously believed such an

area open to criticism existed.

In Barenblatt he had

returned to a position of judicial

restraint from which

balancing the rights of the individual
government followed.

against those of

This inconsistency in Frankfurter's

record is often difficult to reconcile.

It also leaves open

the issue of whether he can be understood to have presented
a consistent and definable philosophical position.
Although it preceded B a r e n b l a t t , the case of
Beauharnais v.

Illinois

( 1 9 5 2 ) ^ provides insight into

Frankfurter's

jurisprudence in the area of First Amendment

adjudication.

In this case,

201Id. at P. 143.
282Supra Note at 64, P. 284.
203343 U.S. 250 (1952)

the Court was faced with a
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criminal

libel case involving an Illinois statute that made

criminal

any publication that portrayed "depravity,

criminality,
citizens,

unchastity,

of any race,

or lack of virtue of a class of

color,

subjects them "to contempt,

creed or religion" which

derision,

or obloquy or which is

productive of breach of peace or r i o t s . T h e

defendant

Beauharnais was president of a racist Chicago organization,
the White Circle League,
leaflets.

which had distributed racist

The leaflets called on the mayor and city council

of Chicago,

"to halt the further encroachment,

and invasion of white people,
and persons,

their property,

harassment
neighborhoods

by Negro." He urged "one million self

respecting people to unite," stating that "if persuasion and
the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized
by the Negro will not unite us,
rapes,

robbers,

knives,

then the aggressions...

guns and marijuana of the Negro,

surely w i 11 ."
In his defense to the Illinois Courts,

Beauharnais had

asked that the jury be instructed that he could not be found
guilty unless the leaflets were "likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
ync

far above public inconvenience,

annoyance or unrest."

Illinois Court ignored this admonition,

and he was

284Id. at 251 (Quoting the 111. Rev. Statutes— 1949)
205Id. at 253

The

convicted.

The Supreme Court affirmed this conviction in an

opinion written by Justice Felix Frankfurter.

Frankfurter

argued that a sharp distinction existed between restrictions
on political
color,

speech and restrictions that related to race,

creed or religion.

These terms he argued had,

"attained too fixed a meaning to permit political groups to
be brought within" their rubric,

and therefore stood outside

the protection of the First Amendment.
commented,

"Of course," he

"discussion cannot be denied and the right,

well

as the duty,

him,

there was nothing "political" about this speech.

as

of criticism must not be stifled." For
It

didn't rise above the level of "discussion." "If a statute
sought to outlaw libels of political

parties,

quite

different problems not now before us would be raised
this Court sits,

..while

it retains and exercises authority to

nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance
nnc

under the guise of punishing libel."
The year was 1952,

and the decision in this case was

characteristic of its time in history.

Today,

libelous

speech stands within the protective arms of the First
Amendment

90 7

, but obscene speech continues to be regarded as

outside the parameters of First Amendment adjudication.

287See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
288See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 478 (1957)

90S
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Frankfurter,

reinforced here that "fighting words" point of

view which had been penned in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
( 1 9 4 2 ) . ^ Specific "well-defined and narrowly limited"
categories of speech fell
constitutional protection,
obscene,

the profane,

"fighting" words,
First Amendment.

outside of the bounds of
and therefore,

and libelous,

"the lewd and

and in this case,

did not fall under the protection of the
It is also clear that in his

judgment,

this

case did not fall within the province of the Court.
Frankfurter had chosen in this case,
done,

as he had often

to defer to both the State of Illinois and to the

principle of stare d e c i s i s . The decision in Chaplinsky had
to stand.

Frankfurter did not distinguish between First

Amendment cases and the Commerce Clause. His opinion in
Beauharnais echoed the rational basis test the Court had
adopted to deal with economic policy questions.

If the

assembly had a rational basis for choosing as it did,
courts should not second-guess

legislative wisdom.

the

710

Justice Hugo Black's dissent in the Beauharnais case
may perhaps provide what in the judgment of some represents
the appropriate refutation of Frankfurter's position here:
We are told that freedom of petition and
discussion are in o danger 'while this court
sits.' This case raises considerable doubt. Since

m 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
210Supra Note 181, P. 113
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those who peacefully petition for changes in the
law are not to be protected 'while this court
sits,' who is? I do not agree that the
Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly,
speech, press or worship at the mercy of a caseby-case, day-by-day majority of the Court...To say
that a legislative body can, with this Court's
a p p r o v a l , make it a crime to petition for and
publicly discuss proposed legislation seems as
farfetched to me as it would be to say that a
valid law could be enacted to punish a candidate
for president for telling the people his
views...If there be minority groups who hail this
holding as their victory, they might consider the
possible relevancy of this ancient remark:
'Another such victory and I am undone.'777
Frankfurter and Black undoubtedly saw the
responsibilities of a Supreme Court
different angles.
judiciary,

justice from very

Despite the powerful position taken by the

the perception of a judge as to his role in

American life is often based in doubt and uncertainty.

As

they must proceed without the legitimacy that popular
sovereignty would provide,

judges must continue to justify

both to themselves and to the people the exercise of their
judicial

authority.

The result has been that the American

judicial

tradition has been marked with ambiguity.

Justices

Black and Frankfurter are part of that tradition.
Oliver Wendell Holmes had written as early as 1897
that:
Behind the logical form (of the judicial opinion)
lies a judgment as to the relative worth and

211343 U.S. at 274,275.
n2Sipra Note 174, P.219.
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importance of competing legislative grounds, often
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
p r o c e e d i n g .213
And Justice Cardozo made his own contribution to our
understanding in this area when in 1921 he wrote:
More subtle are the forces so far beneath the
surface that they cannot reasonably be clasified
as other than subconscious. It is often through
these subconscious forces that judges are kept
consistent with themselves, and inconsistent with
a n o t h e r ... There is in each of us a stream of
tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy
or not, which gives coherence and direction to
thought and action. Judges cannot escape that
current any more than other mortals. *
Harold J. Spaeth,

in the introduction to an interesting

essay that deals with the voting record of Justice
Frankfurter and his alleged judicial

restraint,

argues that,

there has been a pronounced reluctance to accept the idea
that most,

if not all,

judicial decisions are in truth

products of the judge's attitudes regarding basic policy
issues.

In his view,

the Warren Court

"Not only for Frankfurter,

justices,

but for all

the concept of judicial

restraint

is an effective means of rationalizing responses t° policy-

Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law
Review 10 (March 1897), P. 465.
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Mew
Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) P. 11-12.
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oriented v a l u e s . " ^ Spaeth's position is clearly worthy of
important consideration.
What is also arguable is that Frankfurter the private
citizen and Frankfurter the justice of the Supreme Court
were apparently contradictory characters.

The progressive

pre-Court Frankfurter sought a more "liberal" stance from
the political

arena.

The man who sat on the highest court of

the land appears to have predicated his positions on an
innate sense of what was to be the basic responsibility of a
Supreme Court

justice.

These were not necessarily

c o mpatible.
Alexander Meiklejohn,
Frankfurter,

a life-long friend of Felix

cites what he considers to have been,

an

argument that sapped the very foundations of American
political

freedom.

In his extremely patriotic little book,

Political F r e e d o m , The Constitutional

Powers of the P e o p l e .

Meiklejohn adds a quotation which Frankfurter had chosen to
quote authoritatively.

It is the majority decision in

Robertson v. B a l d w i n . rendered in 1897:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first
ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known
as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay
down any novel principles of government, but
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities
which we had inherited from our English ancestors,
and which had from time immemorial been subject to
n1i;

_
Harold J. Spaeth, "The Judicial Restraint of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter— Myth or Reality," 8 Midwest Journal of Political Science.
1964.
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certain w e l 1-recognized exceptions arising from
the necessities of the case. In incorporating
these principles into the fundamental law there
was no intent of disregarding the exceptions which
continued to be recognized as if they had been
formally expressed. ® (*my italics)
In addition, Meiklejohn quotes Felix Frankfurter's own
words,

"That this represents the authentic view of the Bill

of Rights and the spirit in which it must be construed has
been recognized
within the

again and again in cases that

have come here

last fifty years.

It is those "exceptions" which would appear to have
often been part of Frankfurter's First Amendment
jurisprudence.

What must be questioned is whether he

considered

them as such simply because he had

definitive

line around the accepted province of the

judiciary,

drawn a

or whether in his frequent deference to the

legislature,

he was not in actuality making a very

"political" statement.
This highly enigmatic
quoting from Holmes,
mentor,

justice,

although incessantly

that man who had become his idol and

appeared to take himself far more seriously as a

judge. Although he often maintained that Holmes's skepticism
was his own,

one must wonder whether he was not,

as his

AW
As cited in Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom The
Constitutional Powers of the People. (New York: Harper Roe, 1960) P.

101.
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predecessor had been,
which produced him.

the product of his past and the era

Frankfurter's understanding of the place

the Court must hold in American life is expressed in words
he wrote in 1947:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its
expression should come from those popularly chosen
to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as
courts are not. The pressure on legislatures to
discharge their responsibility with care,
understanding and imagination should be stiffened,
not relaxed. Above all, they must not be
encouraged in irresponsible or undisciplined use
of language. In the keeping of legislatures
perhaps more than any other aroup is the w e l l 
being of their fellow-men.

These were the evocations of a lifetime student of the
law, an immigrant Jewish boy from the lower East Side of
Manhattan,

a young student at Harvard who idolized the

Brahman culture out of which Oliver Wendell Holmes had come.
Felix Frankfurter was a man who had involved himself with
great passion in the political
before coming to the Court.
Sacco and Vanzetti,
to changing times,

life of his adopted country

He was also the defender of

the relativist who saw law as a response
and the intellectual

elitist who as a

Harvard professor of law found himself a supporter of
Franklin Roosevelt and suddenly a justice of the Supreme
Court.

Frankfurter was all

of these,

and it is not difficult

to understand why he is so hard to place in one specific
^1Q
Felix Frankfurter, ",Sane Reflections an the Reading of
Statutes," Columbia Law Review. May, 1947, P. 545-546
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category.

His words would often belie his actions,

but the

over-riding desire to "balance" between a sense of political
obligation and what he believed was the role of the Supreme
Court remain integral
categorical
restraint,

to understanding him. Neither a

realist or consistent in his use of judicial
Frankfurter's career on the Court was often a

confusing phenomenon.
If the philosophical

position taken by Legal Realism

had been that words are created,

defined and applied by

individuals within the framework of a specific social and
historical

context,

thus making each act of judicial

interpretation an act of social

choice,

Felix Frankfurter's

term on the Court would frequently find him confronting the
viability of such a standard.
He had undoubtedly responded in the Gobitis case to
the social
himself.

and historical

context within which he found

This opinion had been predicated upon its relevance

to the needs of a specific historical
done before him,

As Holmes had

Frankfurter saw the time of war as

different than any other.

If perhaps the freedom to freely

practice one's religion was,
a given,

period.

in ordinary circumstances to be

the realist in Justice Frankfurter saw wartime as

that circumstance in which specific social
mandatory.
of thought,

choices were

His opinion in Bridges would follow the same line
and in Schneiderman as well,

he would indicate

143

what he referred to as his "religious" sense of patriotism.
It was clearly his view that in specific instances legal
rules did not exist to carry out the logical dictates of
abstract principles,

but must advance practical

results in

particular situations.
In L u d e c k e , we find him standing with the legal
absolutists.

The year was 1948,

and the Second World War was

over for all intents and purposes,
powers of the President,

Frankfurter chose here to strictly

interpret the Constitution.

This was an opportunity to stand

behind his philosophy of judicial
conceal

but pointing to the war

restraint,

but it seems to

a highly biased belief in conserving the over-riding

power of established Constitutional

authority.

In his concurrence in the Dennis case Frankfurter's
opinion is questionable on the grounds that it did in fact
make a politically preferential

statement. Was he not,

in

asking whether the First Amendment could deprive Congress of
its constitutionally given power to decide what was
necessary for this country's protection,
speaking from a conservative stance,
an obviously political
supremacy,

view?

not in actuality

while also expressing

In deferring to Congressional

Frankfurter had selected to put extensive power

in the hands of the legislature.

And although this was not

outwardly embracing Legal Realism,
is difficult to ignore.

his obvious subjectivity

The anti-Communist social milieu in
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which he stood cannot be separated from the choice he made
here.
In Watkins Frankfurter would take what might be
construed as another partisan position.
concurrence in the Court's opinion,

By virtue of his

and its decision based

on the latent ambiguity in the procedures of the Un-American
Activities Committee,
political

sidelines.

Frankfurter was not standing on the
It is highly possible that he had been

influenced by the time in which this opinion was rendered.
The year was 1957,

and the House Un-American Activities

Committee had fallen into disfavor.

Although he undoubtedly

preferred that his opinion be construed as a reaffirmation
of the necessary non-intervention of the Court in matters of
national

policy,

Frankfurter's decision to rule for Watkins

made a "silent" but important social statement.
Sweezv as well does not provide us with entirely
objective behavior.
his own history,

Frankfurter's decision was influenced by

and by a very personal philosophy regarding

education and educators.

There was no discernable "judicial

restraint" in the choice he made in this case.

As a man who

had spent so much of his life as a professor of law, his
opinion was a straightforward evocation of a belief that
education played an integral
progressive society.

Social

role in the development of a
awareness was clearly his
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motivation,

and we find him underlining realist

epistemology.
His concurrence in the Court's opinion in Barenblatt
once more put Justice Frankfurter in a variant position. Why
had he selected in this case to contradict his determination
in W a t k i n s , using judicial

restraint as the rationale? Why

did he decide to rule here against an educator when he had
earlier made clear his reason for doing so?
Beauharnais also leaves us with doubt as to
Frankfurter's calculabi1ity as a judge.
him underlining legislative authority,
d e c i s i s . and ignoring the social
Often the highly verbal

This decision found
deferring to stare

implications of his choice.

advocate of judicial

restraint as

well as the quiescent voice of Legal Realism,
Frankfurter's First Amendment decisions
confusing vagueness.
sincerity,

leave us with a

Not casting any aspersions on his

one cannot help but attribute much of this

discontinuity to his earliest beginnings.
throughout his judicial
position.

Felix

Frankfurter sought

life to maintain a system conserving

His professed judicial

restraint was often an

effort to underline what he believed to be a justice's
necessary deference to the higher authority of the
Constitution and the legislature.
that there are political
rendered.

Nonetheless,

it is clear

implications in those opinions he

Some of this confusion may be linked to a desire
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to protect

the foundations

of his adopted country,

but it

also indicated an underlying need to find a true sense of
"belonging".

Never feeling entirely confident that he could

be accepted by the establishment,

Felix Frankfurter assumed

a centrist position on the Supreme Court.

This was a posture

which found him balancing between a belief that the Court
must serve as only the mediator between the people and the
legislature,

and an ongoing wish to truly be part of that

culture which had produced an Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Perhaps his opinion in D e n n i s . and the choice he made
there to defer to the New York State legislature,

provides

the place where Frankfurter's awareness of the social
context
Realism,
choice,

joined with his

judicial

restraint.

In line with

he had undoubtedly made both a political
a choice predicated upon the societal

and social

climate and

the growing antipathy Americans were feeling toward
Communism.

The often deferential

position he would take on

the issue of state sovereignty as well as legislative
supremacy was satisfied here as well.
Watkins again provided the opportunity for the Justice
to make both a political

and a system conserving choice.

Although maintaining that the decision had been made on
"technical" grounds,

Frankfurter's opinion spoke to anything

but the actions of a passive observer. The year was 1957,
and it was clear that the Un-American Activities Committee
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had fallen into disfavor.

Although he undoubtedly preferred

that his decision be construed as the necessary n o n 
intervention of the judiciary in matters of politics,
Frankfurter's decision was undoubtedly a political

one.

How does the decision in Dennis align itself with
Realism? One must argue that it served as a real enigma.

The

machinations of the Un-American Activities Committee had
clearly made them a questionable entity. Was Frankfurter
unaware that the committee had often appeared to infringe on
the rights of many American citizens? How could he have
rationally chosen,

as he would do here,

to in fact condone

their actions by ruling against the defendants? There is
good reason to argue that Frankfurter's alleged desire to
remain apolitical

and to defer to Congressional

was in this case a highly political stance.
realist philosophy,

supremacy

In line with a

he had surely made a social

choice,

but

was this a choice predicated upon an awareness of history
and the social

context in which it was being made,

or had he

choosen to ignore these issues in order to vindicate his
judicial

restraint?

In Watkins and Sweezy we find more confusion.
Watkins case,

In the

Frankfurter would take what might be construed

as a highly political

stance by virtue of his concurrence.

Although he maintained that the decision was based on
"technical" grounds,

and that the defendant had not been
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appropriately informed of his rights,
act of social
year was 1957,

this was clearly an

choice--hardly an apolitical

judgment.

The

and the House Un-American Activities

Committee had fallen into disfavor.

Although he undoubtedly

preferred that his decision be construed as the necessary
non-intervention of the judiciary in matters of politics,
Frankfurter's choice to rule for Watkins made a "silent"
statement with strong political
well,

implications.

did not provide the apolitical

justice.

S w e e z y . as

act of a Supreme Court

Frankfurter's opinion was undoubtedly prejudiced by

his own history,

and by a very personal

was no obvious "judicial

philosophy.

There

restraint" apparent in the choice

he would make here. As a man who had spent many years as a
professor of the law, Frankfurter spoke as a realist,

a man

who recognized the over-riding importance of education and
the undeniable place educators played in American life.
The case of Barenblatt v. United S t a t e s . and
Frankfurter's concurrence in the Court's decision,
represents further mystification.

One must wonder why he

selected here to contradict his decision in W a t k i n s .
returning once again to the position of judicial

restraint

which he had so obviously attempted to maintain.
Beauharnais as well

leaves us with doubt as to

Frankfurter's predictability.

Arguing that the defendant's

behavior could not be construed as "political," this opinion
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returned the Justice to the stance of the 1ibertarian--the
man of social

awareness who appeared to have been missing in

Dennis.
Sometimes the voice of Realism,
of judicial
decisions

restraint,

and often the advocate

Felix Frankfurter's free speech

leave us with a contradictory pattern that defies

categorization.

He remains as he originally appeared,

but in

many ways as a somewhat less dynamic contributor to the
history of the Supreme Court than his mentor Holmes.
This casts no aspersions on his sincerity,
undeniable truth of his beginnings.
throughout his judicial
position.

but rather on the

Frankfurter fought

life to maintain a system conserving

Perhaps it was this over-riding desire which had

its foundations in his immigrant roots,
need to belong.

and his ever present

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The introductory portion of this examination defined
Legal Realism as that school

of law which reached its peak

in the 1930s and early 1940s.

It had argued that judicial

decision making was not and could not be the result of
logical deduction.

The realists claimed that formalism had

to fail because of the limits of our language and logic and
the indeterminacy of moral and normative concepts.
such a view,

Under

concepts were merely conventions of social

life.
In presenting such a definition,

we have attempted to

discover whether Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes
stood as primary examples of such a philosophy.

The effort

toward finding a satisfactory answer to this question has
necessitated a study of more than just the Supreme Court
decisions which colored the lives of these two men.

Both

Frankfuter and Holmes surely were the product of their
beginnings.

They were also the outgrowth of years spent in

defining the responsibilities of a justice on the highest
court in the American legal system.
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The initial

argument made here was that neither man saw

himself as a dispenser of the societal

good,

and both

consistently argued that the Supreme Court must only be the
"mediator" between the people and the legislature,
apolitical,

and thus not becoming the dispenser of social

policy.

After extensive examination,

neither

justice was successful

"judicial

remaining

one must conclude that

in producing this desired

restraint."

Judicial

responsibility often called for them to make

choices that would have social

implications,

and thus if we

are to truly understand them, we must recognize that we
cannot separate out political

philosophy and social

awareness from their jurisprudence.
Perhaps the important question raised by this study is
whether one can find a common ground between Legal Realism
and Judicial Restraint.
legislature,

A judge who defers to the

is in fact taking a political

not denying his sense of social

position. He is

responsibility.

He is simply

making a subjective evalutation as to how the best interests
of society might be served.
political

What one cannot ignore are the

implications that come of the confluence of these

two seemingly disparate philosophies of law.
Justice Holmes,
skepticism,

proudly underlining his

legal

saw no problem with rendering opinions which

were often contradictory. One can point to his decisions in
Schenck or Debs as simply subjective evaluations of the
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societal needs of the time.

The basis of his jurisprudence

was that law was a changing phenomenon.

To be a judge was to

first be a human being whose choices were necessarily
personal

responses to specific situations.

Of primary

importance was that the judge must not be the blind
dispenser of objectified law. He was the subjective
interlocutor of the law, who in light of the social setting
of a particular case must make that judgment which as a
member of the Court he was obi iged to make.

I find no

conflict here with Holmes's stated sense that judicial
review was appropriate only when legislation deprived
citizens,

without any rational basis,

fundamental

of rights that were

and accepted by virtue of tradition.

If he was

responsible as a justice of the Court to render a decision
in a particular case, Holmes based his choice on a personal
perception of the societal need, not so often on blind
compliance with the law of the land.
To the liberals of the early years of the twentieth
century,

Holmes was the prime example of

In his hands,

judicial

technique.

the judiciary was to remain subservient to the

will of the majority,

and political decisions were to be

placed in the hands of reform minded legislators who might
thus produce social

change. Unfortunately,

this point of

view would see its fruition in a confusing relationship
between the Court and the issues of liberalism and democracy
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during the years that followed his tenure on the Court.
Justice Holmes's free speech decisions emphasized the power
of the majority to restrict the speech of the minority.

His

"clear and present danger test" enunciated such a
phi 1o s o p h y .
Felix Frankfurter,

attempting to pick up the scepter

his mentor had handed down,
same point of view.

presented a continuation of the

An ardent advocate of Supreme Court

deference to the legislature,
majority,
judicial

and thus to the will

of the

he argued as Holmes had done before him for
restraint.

But for both the mentor and the man who

had become his willing novitiate,

judicial

restraint seems

simply an idealized view of what each believed the
responsibility of a Supreme Court

justice to be.

In reality,

their actions on the Court were never entirely consistent
with such a view.

It is clear that a judge's choice not to

decide is in fact to decide.

Even the restrained jurist is

promulgating policy decisions when he defers.

The question

has been asked whether any reasonable individual

can believe

that a person who has attained the position of Supreme Court
justice is able to submerge his politics entirely in
deference to vague notions of judicial

restraint.

91Q

7

\q
L Harold J. Spaeth and Stuart H. Tager "Activism and Restraints
Cloak for the Justices' Policy Preferences" Supreme Court Activism and
Restraint, ed. Stephen C. Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, (Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982) P. 297.
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There is undoubtedly a clear similarity in the
performances of Holmes and Frankfurter on the bench.
brought ideals to the Court.
of Legal Realism,

Together they shared the credo

and in the final analysis were more often

true to it than not.

Realism is not an unequivocal

It changes in each new historical

restraint,

concept.

context and does not

necessarily speak to either liberal
preferences.

Each

or conservative

It can express itself in both activism and

and often in the contradictory decisions of our

Supreme Court

justices.

Perhaps what has emerged from this examination is more
significant than finding a perfect ideological niche for
either Holmes or Frankfurter.

What has developed here is

only further corroboration of the indeterminacy of their
records,

and the often inconsistent character of their

decisions.

To study their free speech opinions is to

recognize the ultimate failure of their

judicial

restraint.

Although they clearly wished that the Supreme Court serve as
simply the interlocutor between the American people and
their representatives,

to read Holmes's opinion in Schenck

or Frankfurter's words in Gobitis it is impossible to ignore
the political

implications to be found there.

Both judges are symbolic of a great tradition.

They

were men who in their devotion to the American Constitution
and the rule of law attempted to avoid personal preferences.
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It is clear that neither could realistically fulfill such a
goal.

Together,

Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter

stand as distinctive personalities in the history of the
Supreme Court.

To acknowledge their individual

tenures is to

better understand the changing times in which they lived,

it

is also strong reinforcement for a truth which both men
recognized.
being,

A justice of the Supreme Court is also a human

a man who cannot deny his heritage or overlook (no

matter how hard he trys)

the unavoidable politicality of the

job he has been selected to do. To "judge" entails the
necessary decisions he or she must make,

and to deny this

reality is to ignore the etymology of the word.

Scholars

have attempted to categorize both of these men,

but such an

endeavor must prove futile.

The common thread that binds

them can be found in the words of Holmes,

written in the

year 1881:

The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience. The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow men, have a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining, the rules
by which men should be governed.
Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes bore living
testament to such a judicial philosophy.

It is also

important that we consider the possibility that for men such

^ A s found in The Caiman Law, Op cit 95.
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as these,

a necessary congruence did emerge between their

obvious belief that a judge's decisions were undoubtedly
influenced by subjective motivations,
that for this very reason,
they must pursue.
or not,

judicial

and their recognition

restraint was a goal

Regardless of whether they were successful

this is a highly significant understanding that has

come of this examination,

and may well explain the

indeterminacy of their records.
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